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I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding Title VII law has never been easy. From the
beginning, there have been sharp disputes about the meaning of
"discrimination" under the Act' and the degree to which employers should
be held strictly accountable for discriminatory actions of supervisors and
employees. Early debates tended to pit those who envisioned the Act as a
results-oriented measure aimed at ending racial and gender hierarchies in
the workplace against those who viewed the legislation primarily as a
process-oriented check against the use of race or gender as a factor in
employer decisionmaking.2  The former generally endorsed a broad
interpretation of the Act generous to plaintiffs, while the latter tended to be
more receptive to interpretations favoring employers.
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1. Neither the original 1964 Civil Rights Act nor the 1991 Act defined the term
"discrimination." The 1991 Act, however, did make it clear that practices with a disparate impact could
violate the law, even if they were not intentionally discriminatory. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k)(1)(A)(B)(C) (1994).
2. Compare Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 73-75 (1972) (endorsing a results-
oriented approach to disparate impact theory), with Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the
Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a
Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 432 (1985) (arguing that Congress in 1964 did
not endorse disparate impact theory).
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The fault lines in contemporary scholarship are much harder to
characterize. Contemporary doctrinal debates have tended to focus
narrowly on particular statutory provisions or modes of proof, and
emerging theories do not always line up as predictably along ideological
lines. 3 The interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court has only
made things messier: On several occasions, Congress has stepped in to
express its disapproval of conservative Court rulings, 4 without, however,
dramatically changing the prevailing judicial approach to interpreting the
Act.5 The last major statutory revision was the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a
sweeping reform that affected each major framework of liability, 6
introduced jury trials, and significantly altered the remedial scheme of the
Act.7
3. For example, one recent major theoretical article favors large-scale structural changes in
workplaces to promote gender equity, but advocates leaving employers considerable freedom to devise
their own substantive rules and procedures to comply with Title VII. See Susan Sturm, Second
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462-64
(2001). This proposal goes against the conventional wisdom that fears that privatization will result in
placing low priority on gender equity, subordinating equality to the goals of promoting efficiency or
preserving traditional ways of doing business. See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form
from Substance: Understanding Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 1 (1999) (discussing employer litigation-prevention strategies that may mask
discrimination).
4. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (overruling
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), by placing pregnancy within the meaning of
discrimination "on the basis of sex"); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub: L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (overruling or changing five Supreme Court opinions, including aspects of Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
5. The latest empirical evidence indicates that appellate courts prefer defendants in employment
discrimination suits. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal: An
Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (July 16, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that 5.8% of employer victories are reversed on appeal, compared to
a reversal rate of 43.6% for plaintiff victories-a gap that is bigger than. any other category of cases,
including civil prisoner cases), available at http://www.findjustice.com/ms/pdf/double-standard.PDF;
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really
Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 949 (2002). Trial judges also tend to
favor defendants in employment discrimination suits. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560 (2001) (stating that plaintiffs are only
half as successful when their cases are tried before a judge).
6. The 1991 Act codified the mixed-motivation framework for individual disparate treatment
cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m), (g)(2)(B); clarified that there is no business-necessity defense for
systemic disparate treatment, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)(2); revamped the framework for disparate
impact litigation, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)(1)(A); and provided damages and jury trials for suits
alleging intentional discrimination, including harassment suits, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a.
7. Plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination are now entitled to jury trials and may seek
compensatory and punitive damages, changes that some have argued have made Title VII more tort-like
in character, rather than exclusively equitable and preventive. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 918 (1993).
TITLE VII'S MIDLIFE CRISIS
After more than a decade of litigation under the revised Act, it is fair
to say that Title VII law has never been more complex and confusing. The
number of available frameworks of liability has increased and each has
become increasingly elaborate. 8  Calls for simplification abound,9 as
commentators seem to recognize that there is something unseemly about a
law prohibiting employment discrimination that few employees can
comprehend. As I see it, Title VII is experiencing a midlife crisis as it
transforms into a highly technical field where nonspecialists fear to tread.
At this point in Title VII's life, it is particularly difficult to define the
boundaries of the various types of claims and to arrive at an appropriate
categorization of cases.10 For example, are some cases by their nature
harassment rather than disparate treatment cases, or is it simply a matter of
the litigation strategy pursued by the plaintiffs attorney? Should the
categorization of a case affect the available remedies, or does it simply
change the model used to establish liability? How can we best describe the
boundaries in Title VII law-as clearly distinct, somewhat overlapping and
permeable, or wholly illusory?
In this Article, I attempt to get at the boundary crisis by examining an
important corner of Title VII doctrine-the law governing claims of
constructive discharge. 1  A constructive discharge occurs when an
8. As I count them, there are currently four basic frameworks of liability, each with its own
special elements and allocations of burden of proof. The field is now divided into (1) individual
disparate treatment, (2) systemic disparate treatment, (3) disparate impact, and (4) harassment. The
conventional wisdom may still be that there are three basic frameworks of liability: individual disparate
treatment, systemic disparate treatment, and disparate impact, with harassment classified as a variation
of individual disparate treatment. The specialized rules governing hostile environment cases, however,
justify treating harassment as a distinctive framework, even though the Court regards harassment as a
form of intentional discrimination. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998)
("Sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct.").
9. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in
Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539 (2001) (decrying the "disarray of the lower federal courts that has
persisted for more than twenty years"); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107
YALE L.J. 1683, 1799 (1998) (arguing for a streamlined cause of action focusing on causation, harm,
and employer responsibility); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination
Law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709, 710 (2002)
(describing the structure of disparate treatment proof as "wildly complicated"). But see Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 579-80 (2001) (arguing that
simplification of Title VII doctrine may produce inequities in race discrimination cases).
10. See Cheryl L. Anderson, "Thinking Within the Box": How Proof Models Are Used to Limit
the Scope of Sexual Harassment Law, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2001) (criticizing
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for its treatment of Title VII proof models as rigid boxes, making
it more difficult for plaintiffs to plead and prove their case).
11. For a synopsis of the general law governing constructive discharge, see infra notes 42-71.
2004]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
employee quits her job 2 in response to intolerable working conditions,
often a sexually hostile environment. I chose this topic because
constructive discharge is a recurring type of discrimination claim that has
never comfortably fit within the conventional categories of Title VII.
Constructive discharge cases lie at the cusp of two very common types of
discrimination cases: claims of disparate treatment alleging discriminatory
discharge and harassment claims stemming from sexually hostile
environments.
In part because of this classification dilemma, the lower courts are
experiencing considerable difficulty handling even routine constructive
discharge cases. The current split in the circuits centers on whether
employers should be held vicariously liable for the acts of supervisors who
cause their employees to quit their job.13  The courts' problems with
constructive discharge go much deeper, however, affecting both the
substantive elements of the claim and its connection to other Title VII
causes of action. The courts have yet to develop a workable approach that
does not end up treating constructive discharge cases as an anomaly.
Whatever its location within the doctrinal structure of Title VII,
constructive discharge is important as a claim in its own right. The reason
constructive discharge cases are so numerous is that sexual harassment
victims so often quit their job in response to their discriminatory
treatment. 14 Employment discrimination lawyers know that employees are
reluctant to sue their current employer and will often file a claim only after
12. Throughout this Article, I refer to constructive discharge victims as women. I recognize that
men as well as women can be constructively discharged from their job. However, because constructive
discharge so often stems from sexually hostile environments and the large majority of sexual
harassment victims are women, it seems appropriate to use "she" when describing constructive
discharge plaintiffs. See EEOC, SEXUAL HARASSM~lENT CHARGES, EEOC & FEPAs COMBINED: FY
1992-2002 (noting that in 2002, 14.9% of sexual harassment charges were filed by men), at
http://eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment Complaints and Agency Response,
14 SEX ROLES 81, 89 (1986) (finding that nearly twenty-five percent of employees filing complaints of
sexual harassment resigned due to harassment); Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women
and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 28, 31 (1993) (noting that, although there are no carefully controlled studies of effects of
harassment, existing studies indicate ten percent of harassment victims report leaving their job as a
result of harassment); Audrey J. Murrell, Josephine E. Olson & Irene Hanson Frieze, Sexual
Harassment and Gender Discrimination: A Longitudinal Study of Women Managers, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES
139, 141 (1995) ("[O]ne of the frequent responses to harassment is to quit one's job."); Ronni Sandroff,
Sexual Harassment: The Inside Story, WORKING WOMAN, June 1992, at 50 (noting that twenty-five
percent of readers who reported sexual harassment said they were fired or forced to quit their job).
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they have left their job. 5 Constructive discharge claims are thus one
important vehicle by which sexual harassment is challenged by employees
and scrutinized in the courts.
This Article first takes a close look at the legal status of the
constructive discharge claim under Title VII. My point of departure is the
familiar scenario in which a plaintiff asserts that she was forced to quit
because of her supervisor's persistent harassment. In Part H, I summarize
the general law governing constructive discharge and its connection to
sexual harassment doctrine. 16 Under the prevailing doctrine, a plaintiff
alleging constructive discharge must prove more than that she quit her job
when faced with the "severe or pervasive" harassment that defines a
sexually hostile environment. Instead, the high threshold of proof
commonly imposed in constructive discharge cases requires plaintiffs to
prove that working conditions had become so intolerable that a reasonable
employee would have quit in response.
In Part II, I also discuss how the general law of constructive discharge
has been affected by two recent Supreme Court rulings governing employer
liability in sexual harassment cases.17 The burning question that has not
yet been addressed by the Court is whether the affirmative defense that
employers are now permitted to invoke in hostile environment cases will
also be available in constructive discharge cases. This seemingly small
doctrinal issue could affect the outcome in many cases because, in practice,
the affirmative defense has proven to be of great value to employers, often
resulting in defense victories on summary judgment. 18 In many cases,
employers are able to assert the affirmative defense and defeat the claims
of employees who have been subjected to even the most severe forms of
harassment, largely because those employees have failed to pursue formal
complaints through their employers' internal grievance procedures.
In the final section of Part II, I review the current split in the circuit
courts as to the proper approach to analyzing constructive discharge
15. See Theresa Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 124-25 (2001) ("[Mlany plaintiffs' lawyers would tell you that once
an employee complains about discrimination on the job, he or she can usually consider that employment
relationship over."); Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation Choices
of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SoCy REV. 67, 75 (1999) (noting that among thirty-one
women studied, "job loss, or fear of it, was the primary consideration for a serious consideration of
litigation").
16. See infra Part ILA-B.
17. See infra Part llB.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
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claims. 19 So far, two major positions have emerged. The first allows
employers to assert the affirmative defense and draws no distinction
between ordinary hostile environment cases and claims of constructive
discharge. 20  The second line of cases imposes automatic liability on
employers and treats constructive discharge as a "tangible employment
action" that differentiates it from ordinary hostile environment cases. 21 For
the most part, however, the lower court decisions have only scratched the
doctrinal surface and have not yet clearly explained how constructive
discharge fits into the broader Title VII structure.
To see what lies underneath the classification dilemma, Part III
analyzes constructive discharge along five distinct (but interrelated) Title
VII categorical axes. First, at the most superficial level, there is the
question of whether a claim of constructive discharge in a harassment suit
should be treated as a tangible employment action or under the hostile
environment rubric.22 Second, scratching the surface a bit is whether such
a constructive discharge is more properly regarded as a type of disparate
treatment that results in a termination (akin to a conventional discharge) or,
alternatively, as a particularly virulent kind of harassment.23 Third, on a
bit more abstract level, one might ask whether the categorization of such
constructive discharge cases depends on the official or formal nature of an
employer's action (with an emphasis on the official decisionmaking
process) or turns on the effect24 or impact that the employer's behavior has
on the targeted employee, regardless of the informal or unofficial nature of
the employer's behavior.
Under current law, the answers to the foregoing three category
questions are not merely academic, but have a significant effect on
substantive law and employer liability. This is because the categorization
determines the fourth question of whether the employer will be held
vicariously liable for the acts of its supervisory employees or will be able
to escape liability if it is not at fault under a specialized set of negligence
principles. 25 Fifth and finally, there is the nagging question of whether the
problem posed by a constructive discharge case is primarily a question of
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part I.C. 1.
21. See infra Part II.C.2.
22. See infra Part nI.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part III.D.
[Vol. 77:307
TITLE VII'S MIDLIFE CRISIS
remedy (i.e., applying the appropriate standards for the award of backpay)
rather than substantive law.26
Ultimately, I conclude that, with respect to each of these five axes, it
cannot be said that constructive discharge, by its nature, falls on one side of
the fence rather than the other. Once unpacked, the classification may have
less to do with the nature of the claim than with general attitudes toward
sexual harassment and injuries linked to women. 27 My dissection of the
constructive discharge claim leads me to believe that underneath the
categorization dilemma lies a contest over who should be held responsible
for the loss of the employee's job-the employee or her employer. My
primary point is that at the crux of the constructive discharge litigation is a
question of attribution of responsibility, rather than one of the proper
characterization of the nature of the action.28
Part IV turns from doctrine and category dilemmas to those policy
considerations especially relevant for constructive discharge cases. I focus
on the emerging requirement placed on employees to report harassment
through their employer's internal grievance procedures and discuss how
this requirement is at odds with the way employees actually behave and
respond to harassment. 29 This part reviews the social science literature on
sexual harassment reporting30 and discusses some of the drawbacks of
employer-controlled systems of dispute resolution. 31
Part V then sets forth four guiding principles for interpreting Title VII
that I argue courts should consider before finally settling on an approach to
constructive discharge. 32 The first two principles relate to how business
enterprises are perceived by the courts. I urge courts to recognize the
importance of informal, as well as formal, corporate and institutional
structures 33 and to recognize the use and significance of informal, as well
as formal, power of supervisors within the organization. 34  The third
principle relates to the way courts judge the actions of employees who
claim to have suffered discrimination. I make the case for treating the
common or typical response of victims as a reasonable response and for
stopping the practice of penalizing or blaming victims for acting the way
26. See infra Part III.E.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 214-42.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 270-74.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 293-301.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra text accompanying note 306.
34. See infra text accompanying note 307.
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most employees would under the circumstances. 35 Against the grain of the
case law, I also argue that employees should have the right to quit their job
if they are forced to work in a hostile environment. 36 The fourth and final
principle relates to categorization of harm stemming from discrimination in
the workplace. I urge recognition of the interrelationship between
economic harms on the one hand and psychological harms on the other.
37
Because one type of harm frequently coexists with the other, or tends to
produce the other, I believe it is futile and unwise for courts to try to draw
sharp lines between economic and other losses. Instead, each should be
treated as a legitimate, job-related injury worthy of compensation.
Overall, I maintain that following these four principles would
strengthen the law's capacity to prevent and remedy harassment and would
further the goal of compensating victims of employment discrimination.
Although informed by feminist theory and social science research, I regard
these principles as simple statements of policy, fully consistent with the
language and history of the Act and easily incorporated into judicial
interpretations of Title VII.
In Part VI of this Article, I return to constructive discharge and outline
three possible models for courts to use in this type of case.38 In addition to
the two models most often advocated by defendants 39 and plaintiffs
respectively, 40 I develop a causation-based model that embraces the four
guiding principles discussed above.4 1 My proposal would streamline the
constructive discharge claim by focusing on three basic elements: (1)
discrimination, (2) causation, and (3) damages. Under this simplified
model, a plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages for constructive
discharge whenever she proved that discrimination-either in the form of a
hostile work environment or some other discrete discriminatory action-
proximately caused her to quit her job.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE IN LEGAL CONTEXT
These days, the prototypical Title VII constructive-discharge case is a
harassment case. More precisely, it is a case of virulent sexual harassment
in which conditions have become so intolerable for a female employee that
35. See infra text accompanying note 309.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 310-11.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 314-18.
38. See infra Part VI.
39. See infra Part VI.A.
40. See infra Part VI.B.
41. See infra Part VI.C.
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she is forced to quit her job. ; Factually, the prototypical constructive
discharge case is closely tied to the hostile environment claim. The
employee attempts to prove that the hostile environment caused her to quit
and what would otherwise be regarded as a voluntary resignation should be
treated as an involuntary termination.
A. GENERAL LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
Under the general law of constructive discharge, if the plaintiff is
successful in proving such a paradigm case of constructive discharge, she
will be entitled to recover two sets of damages: not only those damages
flowing from the hostility of supervisors and co-workers while on the job,
such as emotional distress and possibly punitive damages, but also damages
flowing from the loss of her job-most notably, backpay and frontpay.42 It
is important to note at the outset that courts generally will not allow a
plaintiff who quits to recover backpay and frontpay unless she proves a
constructive discharge.43 Victims of hostile environments who cannot
prove constructive discharge are thus limited to those compensatory and
punitive damages traceable to the abuse on the job.
The difference in available remedies between a hostile environment
and constructive discharge case is not the only difference between the two
causes of action. By far, most courts also employ a more stringent standard
of liability for proof of constructive discharge than they do for proof of
hostile environment. The most important threshold requirement for
establishing a hostile environment claim is a showing that the harassment
was severe or pervasive." Courts routinely state that it is not enough to
prove isolated instances of harassment, unless the incidents are unusually
42. Backpay and frontpay are particularly important, however, because they are not capped. See
Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848-54 (2001).
43. But see Mark S. Kende, Deconstructing Constructive Discharge: The Misapplication of
Constructive Discharge Standards in Employment Discrimination Remedies, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
39, 52-57 (1995) (describing an approach, adopted by a small minority of courts, that does not require
proof of constructive discharge to recover backpay).
44. In addition to proof of severe or pervasive harassment, the plaintiff in a hostile environment
claim must show (1) unwelcome harassment, (2) based on sex or gender, and (3) respondeat superior
(i.e., in a case of co-worker harassment, that the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take corrective action). In the case of a supervisor, there is strict liability,
subject to the EllerthIFaragher defense, which is discussed in Part 1I.B, infra. See generally Theresa
Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually
Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791,796-97 (2002) (citing cases).
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severe.45 Proof of constructive discharge, however, typically requires even
more than a showing of severe or pervasive harassment.46 The most
common formulation of the constructive discharge standard requires the
plaintiff to prove that the employer has rendered the employee's working
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would quit her job.47
Most significantly, several courts in recent cases have concluded that not
all hostile environments are "intolerable" under the stringent constructive
discharge standard, with the result that plaintiffs who have quit their job
due to unlawful harassment may nevertheless lose on their claim of
constructive discharge. 48  Factfinders are thus called on to make fine
calibrations of the magnitude of the harassment faced by the plaintiff,
implicitly judging between harassment that is bad enough to amount to a
change in working conditions for the plaintiff (the "severe or pervasive"
standard for hostile environments), but not bad enough to justify plaintiff
quitting her job (the "intolerable" standard for constructive discharge).
Additionally, in a few jurisdictions, there is the lingering question of
proof of employer intent in constructive discharge cases. In the minority of
jurisdictions, the employee must provide evidence of an employer's
specific intent to force the employee to resign.49  This evidence may be
especially difficult to come by in those cases of sexual harassment in which
the harasser's motivation appears to be to pressure the plaintiff to have sex
rather than to induce her to quit her job. In the majority of jurisdictions,
45. See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 675-76 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (finding a single
incident of harassment not sufficiently severe to constitute a hostile environment, despite an allegation
that Clinton exposed himself and requested that the plaintiff perform oral sex).
46. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992) ("To prove constructive
discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the
minimum required to prove a hostile working environment."); Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d
7, 28 (1st Cir. 2002); Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 34 (Tenn. 1996); Stacy v. Shoney's,
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 751,756 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
47. The leading case is Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.
1980). See infra text accompanying notes 56-58, 251-61.
48. See, e.g., Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir. 1999)
(entitling the plaintiff to a trial on the hostile environment claim, but rejecting summary judgment on
the constructive discharge claim); Coffman v. Tracker Marine L.P., 141 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1998)
(entitling the plaintiff to emotional distress damages on the retaliation claims, but denying backpay
because there was no constructive discharge).
49. See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 2.50, at 109-10 (2001); Cathy Shuck, That's It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles
in Constructive Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 413-18 (2002) (discussing
the Second and Fourth Circuits' interpretation of the intent requirement). In labor law cases, the NLRB
also requires employees to prove the employer's specific intent to force the employee to resign. See
Crystal Princeton Ref. Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068 (1976); Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb, Constructive Discharge
Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Study in Undue Concern over Motives, 7
INDUS. REL. L.J. 143, 156 (1985).
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however, an "objective" test of deliberateness is used, requiring only that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the employer's conduct would have the
foreseeable result of creating working conditions so unpleasant or difficult
that a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would feel forced to
resign. 50
In sum, the current law of constructive discharge has both a
substantive and a remedial dimension. As a matter of substantive law,
constructive discharge requires a showing of intolerable working
conditions and turns on whether the plaintiff is able to convince the
factfinder that she was justified in quitting her job under the circumstances.
The most important remedial consequence is that, absent proof of
constructive discharge, the plaintiff will not be able to recover the
economic or other losses tied to losing her job, even if she maintains that
the hostile environment caused her to quit and is successful in establishing
a Title VII violation via a hostile environment claim.
It is instructive to note that the calibrated distinction between a mere
hostile environment claim and a hostile environment claim that amounts to
a constructive discharge is a recent doctrinal development that was not
present when the constructive discharge doctrine was first imported into
Title VII law. 51 The early Title VII constructive-discharge cases tended not
to be sexual harassment/hostile environment suits for the simple reason that
the Supreme Court did not endorse the hostile environment cause of action
until 1986.52 Instead, the prototypical case of constructive discharge in this
early era often centered on a discrete discriminatory act, such as a
50. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 49, § 2.50, at 110.
51. The constructive discharge doctrine was imported from labor law. See infra text
accompanying notes 195-203. For examples of early labor cases in which union supporters complained
of management behavior designed to force them to quit, see J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490,
494 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 243 (1st Cir. 1953); and NLRB
v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 140 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 1944). Constructive discharges may
also be alleged in connection with an employer's material breach of contract. In these cases,
constructive discharge is not treated as a separate cause of action, but rather supplies proof of the
discharge element in a claim based on breach of contract. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B.
CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER & ELAINE W. SHOBEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.7, at 695 (2d ed.
1999).
52. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), held that Title VII was not limited to
the kind of quid pro quo harassment that almost invariably resulted in economic loss. The Court
endorsed the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, which defined as actionable "conduct [that] has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." Id. at 58 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (1985)).
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demotion,53 being passed over for promotion,54 or being paid a
discriminatory wage, 55 which the plaintiff claimed caused her to quit her
job in response. For example, one frequently cited opinion written by
Judge Frank Johnson in the Fifth Circuit-Bourque v. Powell Electrical
Manufacturing Co.56-involved a woman who started her career as a
secretary and sought to be promoted to the predominantly male job of
buyer. The plaintiff persuaded her employer to try her out in the buyer's
position at her secretary's salary, but she expected to receive pay
comparable to her male counterparts once she showed her supervisors that
she could do the work satisfactorily. When the employer refused to pay her
a comparable wage even though her supervisors were pleased with her
work in the new position, the plaintiff quit in protest. The court rejected
plaintiffs constructive discharge claim, holding that "discrimination
manifesting itself in the form of unequal pay cannot, alone, be sufficient to
support a finding of constructive discharge." 57  The court indicated that
something more was needed to find the requisite intolerable conditions for
a constructive discharge, hinting that this case was not like the aggravated
situation of continuing discrimination and harassment. 58
At this early period in the development of sexual harassment law,
before the maturity of the hostile environment claim, there were few
occasions to compare the level of harassment required for a Title VII
violation and the presence of aggravating factors sufficient to warrant a
finding of constructive discharge.59 Indeed, one influential commentary on
constructive discharge law seems to have assumed that the presence of
"continuing affronts or hostile working conditions" 60 would be enough to
establish a constructive discharge, suggesting that the terms "severe or
pervasive" and "intolerable working conditions" might well turn out to be
synonymous.
53. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (remanding to determine
whether a demotion caused a constructive discharge); Henry v. Lennox Indus., 768 F.2d 746, 751-52
(6th Cir. 1985) (affirming that a demotion and failure to promote constitutes a constructive discharge).
54. See Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975) (finding no constructive discharge due to a discriminatory denial of promotion).
55. See Waters v. Heublein. Inc., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 351 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding
a discriminatory wage insufficient to establish a constructive discharge).
56. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 65 (citing Cullari v. East-West Gateway Coordinating Counsel, 457 F. Supp. 335, 341
(E.D. Mo. 1978)).
58. Id. at 66.
59. See, e.g., Coley v. Consol. Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (finding a
constructive discharge simply from an employer's failure to remedy a hostile environment).
60. Martin W. O'Toole, Note, Choosing a Standard for Constructive Discharge in Title VII
Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 606 (1986).
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. The important point here, however, is to underscore that when the
standard of intolerable conditions became part of the substantive Title VII
constructive-discharge law, the courts were primarily searching for a way
to distinguish tolerable discriminatory acts from intolerable working
conditions to assure that not all claims of discrimination allowed plaintiffs
to quit their job in protest. They did not devise the intolerable working
conditions requirement as a deliberate contrast to the severe or pervasive
requirement for hostile environment cases. As noted earlier,6 however,
recent cases have tended to assume that the constructive discharge standard
is more stringent than the hostile enVironment standard without thoroughly
analyzing the difference between constructive discharge claims that are
predicated on hostile environments and older-style claims that stem from
discrete discriminatory acts.
Additionally, before the establishment of the hostile environment
claim, courts simply assumed that constructive discharges would entail
vicarious liability for the employer.62 Proof of a constructive discharge
amounted to proof that the employer, not the employee, was responsible for
the termination and was treated like other discriminatory discharges that
gave rise to vicarious liability. Doubts about whether the employer should
be vicariously liable for constructive discharge emerged only when the
courts balked at imposing vicarious liability for supervisor-caused 'sexually
hostile environments in which plaintiffs alleged no other economic harm.
As I develop in depth later in this Article, 63 the courts' reluctance to impose
vicarious liability surfaced when constructive discharge became cognitively
linked to the disfavored claim for sexual harassment and the prototypical
victim became a woman.
On the remedial side, the significance of a finding of constructive
discharge has also evolved over time. Because Title VII contains an
61. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
62. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding a constructive
discharge arising from being assigned a new, less lucrative territory upon returning to work following a
miscarriage); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming that a constructive
discharge stemming from discrimination based on a plaintiffs marriage should be treated like a formal
discharge); Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding damages for a constructive
discharge claim arising from a combination of gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment). In
one of the first federal appellate court decisions to recognize the hostile environment claim, the court
treated the plaintiffs constructive discharge claim as a claim involving a tangible employment
detriment, in contrast to her claim for a hostile work environment. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 906, 909 (1 1th Cir. 1982). Although the court upheld the lower court's ruling that the plaintiff did
not quit because of the intolerable environment, it noted in dicta that vicarious liability was appropriate
for claims asserting tangible job detriments. See infra discussion accompanying notes 210-13.
63. See infra Part III.D.
2004]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
express "duty to mitigate" provision, 64 any recovery of backpay has always
been limited to amounts that the plaintiff did not, or reasonably could not,
recoup through securing comparable employment after quitting her job.
Thus, even the plaintiff who proves constructive discharge is not entitled to
sit tight and wait to be vindicated through a judgment awarding
reinstatement and backpay. Instead, Title VII explicitly requires backpay
awards to be reduced by "interim earnings or amounts earnable with
reasonable diligence." 65 Through the duty to mitigate, Congress provided a
powerful incentive for potential Title VII claimants to seek new jobs and
reduced the possibility that plaintiffs would use discrimination as an excuse
to quit their job and receive pay while they stayed at home and litigated
their claim. From the beginning, the constructive discharge claim has
merely assured that plaintiffs would be compensated for the loss of their
job in the event that they could not find comparable employment, making
the claim most important for employees who work in unique positions or
who are discharged in bad economic times. 66
Before the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, prevailing
on the constructive discharge claim was particularly important for
plaintiffs. Prior to the 1991 Amendments, only equitable remedies were
permitted against employers, 67 such that backpay was generally the only
form of monetary relief available to plaintiffs.68 Plaintiffs who complained
of hostile environments and who quit their job in response could only
recover a money judgment if they proved constructive discharge because
no award for the psychological and other noneconomic harm associated
with being subjected to repeated sexual harassment was available. The
1991 Act first introduced tort-like remedies into the Act, allowing plaintiffs
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2000). For a discussion and critique of the statutory duty of
mitigation, see Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory Anti-Discrimination
Context: Mitigating Its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2000).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l).
66. One state court has even required a plaintiff who was constructively discharged to accept an
unconditional offer of reinstatement from her former employer or be barred from recovering backpay.
See Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, 11 S.W.3d 754, 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). In that
case, the employer claimed that the plaintiff's refusal to return to work was unreasonable because the
harasser was no longer employed by the defendant.
67. Significantly, because individual supervisors are not subject to personal liability under Title
VII, only employers are liable under the Act. See Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81
(4th Cir. 1998); Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 241 (5th Cir. 1998); Cross v. Ala. Dep't of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d
1295, 1313-16 (2d Cir. 1995); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993).
68. Frontpay is also awarded if reinstatement is delayed or is not possible. See Farber v.
Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1990); Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257,
269 (4th Cir. 1976).
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to recover compensatory and punitive damages and have these claims tried
before a jury. Now, hostile environment claimants may recover damages
for the harm they sustain while on the job that stems from the harassment
itself. Thus, even if the constructive discharge claim is unsuccessful,
recovery for hostile environment alone might justify bringing the suit. In
many cases, however, proof of constructive discharge and attendant
recovery of backpay likely remains crucial: The 1991 legislation capped
compensatory and punitive damages at between $50,000 to $300,000,
depending on the size of the employer, 69 and the Supreme Court has placed
strict limitations on the recovery of punitive damages in cases of vicarious
liability where top management is not aware of the misconduct of lower-
level supervisors.70
In contrast, backpay and frontpay are considered equitable remedies
not subject to the caps on recovery.7' These remedies may still represent
the largest heading of monetary relief, especially for highly compensated
employees who cannot find comparable work. The significance of
recovering on the constructive discharge claim thus must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis and remains particularly important for hostile
environment claimants who have not suffered other economic loss in the
form of discriminatory demotions, unequal pay, or lost promotions.
Beyond delineating the elements of the specific claim for constructive
discharge and their remedial consequences, the most vexing problem in this
area of law involves harmonizing the doctrinal requirements for
constructive discharge with the rapidly developing framework for hostile
environment litigation. Although not every case of constructive discharge
is predicated on a hostile environment, now that this type of constructive
discharge has become the paradigm case, judges find that they must look
closely at the two claims and determine whether existing proof
requirements continue to make sense in the overall scheme of harassment
and disparate treatment law evolving under Title VII.
B. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LAW AND THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE
The problem of harmonizing claims of hostile environment and claims
of constructive discharge came more sharply into focus with the 1998
69. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2000).
70. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544-45 (1999) (finding no vicarious liability
for punitive damages if an employer made good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII).
71. See Pollard v. E. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852-54 (2001).
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Supreme Court decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth72 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.7 3 Both these cases involved claims for
sexually hostile environments in which the plaintiffs alleged that they were
harassed by their supervisors. Although the plaintiffs in each case quit
their job in response to the harassment, in neither case was the specific
claim of constructive discharge before the Court.74 Rather, the issue that
principally occupied the Court was the extent to which employers should
be strictly liable for the harassment of supervisors. More specifically, the
Court framed the issue as whether a plaintiff who suffered "no adverse,
tangible job consequences ''75 could recover against an employer without
proof of the employer's negligence or fault. The plaintiff in Ellerth had
been told by her supervisor that he "could make [her] life very hard or very
easy" 76 and made other intimidating sexual overtures toward her, but he
never carried through on the threats. The sexual harassment of the plaintiff
in Faragher took the form of repeated offensive touchings and remarks,
without express or implied threats of dismissal.77 Under the framework
prevailing in the lower courts, Ellerth could arguably have been classified
as a quid pro quo case, subjecting the employer to vicarious liability for the
implied threats of retaliation. In contrast, Faragher would in all likelihood
have been classified as a hostile environment case. When the Court
decided the pair of cases, no consensus had emerged among the lower
courts as to whether such "pure" hostile environment cases should be
governed by negligence or strict liability.
The Court took this opportunity to refine the framework of analysis
for sexual harassment litigation. It set the new demarcation line as between
cases involving tangible employment actions and all other cases, which
would now fall into the category of hostile environment claims. This new
demarcation line resolved the category problem of Ellerth: Because the
case involved only unfulfilled threats with no resulting tangible detriment
to the plaintiff, it was placed in the hostile environment category, even
though it might have qualified as a quid pro quo claim under the old
scheme.
72. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
73. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
74. The question was never even before the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court considered only
whether unfulfilled threats to deny a promotion or raise constituted a tangible employment action. See
Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174-75 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (citing Jansen v. Packaging
Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 492-94 (7th Cir. 1997) (appeal consolidated with Ellerth)).
75. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
76. Id. at 748.
77. Although Faragher was not litigated as an unfulfilled threats case, the plaintiff did allege that
her immediate supervisor had said, "date me or clean the toilets for a year." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
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In important dicta, the Court discussed the meaning of "tangible
employment action," a term it imported from Title VII case law in other
contexts. 78  It first focused on the effect that such an action has on
employees, noting that "[a] tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits." 79  It then theorized on
the connection between tangible employment actions and the special power
wielded by supervisors. The Court explained that "[t]angible employment
actions fall within the special province of the supervisor," 80 and that
"[w]hen a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is
assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency
relation.... As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury."81
Finally, the Court reflected on the connection between tangible
employment actions and the official acts of the enterprise, noting that
"[t]angible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor
brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates. A
tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a
company act."82
This description of tangible employment actions led the Court to
conclude that automatic vicarious liability was warranted when the plaintiff
alleged such an injury. It was convinced that, in that class of case, the
agency relation sufficiently aided the supervisor in carrying out the
harassment and that the employer should be liable, even if the supervisor
acted against company policy and the employer was not negligent in failing
78. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The Court cited four disparate treatment cases in which the courts
denied recovery because plaintiffs had not proven a "materially adverse" employment action. Id. For a
discussion of the courts' propensity to establish threshold "adversity" requirements in Title VII cases,
see Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1142-47 (1998). Some
lower courts, however, have recently drawn a distinction between a "material adverse" action and a
"tangible adverse" action. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 434 n.l (3d Cir. 2003); Gonzales v.
Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., 262 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
79. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
80. Id. at 762.
81. Id. at 761-62. The Court also noted the connection between a tangible employment action
and direct economic harm. The Court explained that "[a] tangible employment action in most cases
inflicts direct economic harm." Id. at 762.
82. Id. The Court also noted that tangible employment actions, presumably in contrast to less
official acts, were documented and subject to review. "The decision in most cases is documented in
official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors. The supervisor
often must obtain the imprimatur of the enterprise and use its internal processes." Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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to prevent the harassment. 83  This pronouncement was in line with the
unanimous holding of the lower courts prior to Ellerth/Faragher to impose
vicarious liability in quid pro quo cases.
The more difficult issue for the Supreme Court was how to approach
liability in cases of supervisory harassment that did not culminate in a
tangible employment action. For these hostile environment cases, the
Court devised a novel solution that imposed vicarious liability on
employers but permitted them to plead and prove an affirmative defense
fashioned along negligence principles. 84 The new two-prong affirmative
defense was clearly the centerpiece of the Court's ruling and would prove
to be the most-litigated aspect of the new jurisprudence on sexual
harassment. Specifically, the Court held:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for
an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When
no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise
an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises two necessary
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise. 85
The affirmative defense essentially requires the employer to prove that
it was not negligent in failing to prevent or correct the harassment and,
most significantly for purposes of this analysis, that the plaintiff was
negligent in failing to mitigate her own harm. The Court explained that the
second prong of the defense would normally be satisfied by a showing that
the plaintiff failed to report the harassment via the complaint procedure
83. See id. at 764-65. In Faragher, Justice David Souter cited additional rationales for holding
an enterprise vicariously liable for tangible employment actions. He noted that some courts have
adopted a variation of the proxy theory, which holds that a supervisor's act "merges" with that of the
employer, and further noted that other courts regard vicarious liability as proper because a supervisor
acts within the scope of his authority when making hiring, firing, and promotion decisions. Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,790-91 (1998).
84. Not all state courts have adopted the EllerthlFaragher approach in interpreting state
antidiscrimination statutes. See. e.g., VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906, 913-14 (Alaska 1999)
(imposing vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors even in a pure hostile work environment
case); Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, I I S.W.3d 754, 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
85. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (internal citation omitted).
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provided by the employer, although it recognized that such a failure might
not always be regarded as unreasonable. 86
It should be noted that the Ellerth/Faragher framework applies only to
cases in which supervisors create the hostile environment. In the many
cases involving hostile environment caused by co-workers or third parties,
such as regular customers or suppliers, the courts have never imposed strict
liability. 87 Because only supervisors are plausibly agents of the employer,
if the harassment is perpetrated by co-workers, the employer is responsible
only for its own negligence in failing to prevent or correct the harassment.
In such cases, the courts have required plaintiffs, as part of their prima facie
case of sexual harassment, to prove that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take prompt corrective action.88
Nothing in EllerthiFaragher suggests a departure from that approach.
Since Ellerth/Faragher, a significant number of courts have ruled for
employers in hostile environment cases, 89 often on summary judgment
motions, 90 because the plaintiffs failed to report the harassment through
designated channels 9 1-a response that is quite common among harassment
victims who seldom file formal complaints. 92 For such plaintiffs who quit
their job in response to harassment by their supervisor and subsequently
86. "[Wlhile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable
care ... is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by
the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally ... satisfy the employer's burden under the
second element of the defense." Id.
87. See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a
negligence standard, not strict liability, applies in cases in which the harasser is a co-worker); Quinn v.
Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that a negligence standard applies in
cases of harassment by outsiders, such as customers).
88. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 796-800; LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 49, § 2.22, at 74-77.
89. See Beiner, supra note 15, at 117, 120-29; Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 708-15 (2000). Cf Ann Juliano &
Stewart Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 587, 591 (2001)
(noting that prior to EllerthlFaragher, plaintiffs who failed to report lost seventy-six percent of the
time).
90. See, e.g., Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (S.D. Ga. 1998). For an
empirical study of post-EllerthlFaragher cases granting summary judgment in favor of employers
because plaintiffs failed to use available grievance procedures, see David Sherwyn, Michael Heise &
Zev J. Eigen, Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An
Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment
Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265 (2001). See also John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the
Disappearance of "Vicarious" Liability: The Emergence of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor
for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38
Hous. L. REV. 1401, 1435 (2002).
91. See Jones, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1385 ("[T]he new keystone to a sexual harassment claim is
notice.").
92. See infra discussion accompanying notes 270-74.
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charge that they were constructively discharged, the characterization of
their case is important. Specifically, if the case is classified as a tangible
employment action, the affirmative defense is not available and their failure
to report will not prevent the imposition of vicarious liability. If the case is
classified solely as a hostile environment action, however, the affirmative
defense is available and the plaintiff's failure to report the harassment
could prove fatal to her claim for injuries stemming both from the hostile
environment and her subsequent loss of employment.
One last doctrinal wrinkle related to notice requirements that needs to
be considered emanates from the substantive law of constructive discharge
rather than the Supreme Court's hostile environment rulings. Many
jurisdictions have held that for a plaintiff to succeed in proving that
conditions have become so intolerable that she was forced to quit her job,
she must first give her employer an opportunity to correct the problem.
93
The reasoning here is that it cannot be said that working conditions are
intolerable unless there is no recourse within the organization. 94 The courts
have stated that, ordinarily, this requires that the plaintiff not assume the
worst and not jump to conclusions. 95  To establish intolerability, the
plaintiff is often required to report the problem and give management an
opportunity to correct it before concluding that quitting is the only
reasonable course of action.
96
That a possible notice requirement is built into the substantive law of
constructive discharge complicates matters because it resembles, but does
not duplicate, the affirmative defense available to employers in hostile
93. See Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 1998); Kilgore v. Thompson &
Brock Mgmt., 93 F.3d 752, 754 (11 th Cir. 1996); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Itz, 21 S.W.3d 456, 474-75
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000). One court even concluded that a plaintiff had not given management sufficient
opportunity to correct the problem for purposes of establishing intolerability under the constructive
discharge claim, even though it upheld a jury finding that the employer's response to her complaint had
been inadequate with respect to her claim of retaliation. See Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P., 141 F.3d
1241, 1247 (8th Cir. 1998). But see Stricker v. Cessford Constr. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1005 (N.D.
Iowa 2001) (finding that a plaintiff may prove constructive discharge even if she does not report
harassment in certain cases); Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, II S.W.3d 754, 764 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1999) (stating that a complaint of sexual harassment is not a necessary precondition to a claim
of constructive discharge).
94. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the concurring justices noted that "[w]here a complainant
without good reason bypassed an internal complaint procedure she knew to be effective, a court may be
reluctant to find constructive termination and thus to award reinstatement or backpay." Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 78 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
95. See Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987); Beran v. Pizza
Hut of Titusville, No. 96-8254, 1997 WL 842395 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 1997), rev'd in part, vacated in
part by Beran v. Pizza Hut of Am., 177 F.3d 981 (11 th Cir. 1999).
96. See Sara Kagay, Note, Applying the Ellerth Defense to Constructive Discharge: An
Affirmative Answer, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1049-50 (2000).
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environment cases. Even if plaintiffs succeed in establishing that a
constructive discharge is a tangible employment action, they may still fail
to establish intolerability (and thus constructive discharge) because they did
not report the harassment and provide the employer with an opportunity to
correct the problem. Additionally, if the court decides that constructive
discharges are not tangible employment actions, there will still be a need to
reconcile the two notice requirements. Should the courts borrow the
substantive law of constructive discharge and place the burden on the
plaintiff to prove that she gave the employer an opportunity to correct the
problem? Or does the hostile environment case law supersede the
substantive law of constructive discharge and place the burden on the
employer to prove that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to report the
harassment?97
The resolution of this subissue depends largely on how the courts
reconcile the doctrines that lie at the intersection of constructive discharge
and hostile environment law more generally. Before getting into a more
extended analysis of the problems posed by the constructive discharge
claim,98 I first present a summary of the current split in the courts on the
all-important threshold issue of whether a constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action.
C. THE SPLIT IN THE LOWER COURTS
Since Ellerth/Faragher refined the distinction between tangible
employment actions and hostile environment cases, the lower courts have
been forced to address the issue of the proper categorization of constructive
discharge cases. Two major approaches emerged in the case law, although
neither position has garnered widespread support.
The issue will soon be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
recently granted certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits. 99 The Court
will likely choose between one of two major approaches that have emerged
in the lower courts. One group of cases led by the Second Circuit regards
constructive discharges as mere hostile environment cases. 100 These cases
stress that because co-workers as well as supervisors can cause constructive
discharges, such actions do not represent official acts of the enterprise. The
other major approach espoused by the Third Circuit treats constructive
97. See infra discussion accompanying notes 329-30.
98. See infra Part III.
99. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 72 U.S.L.W. 3105 (U.S. Dec. 1,2003).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 103-11.
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discharges as tangible employment actions.10 1 These cases emphasize that
the effect on the plaintiff is the same regardless of whether the supervisor
actually fires the employee or takes other deliberate actions that force her
to quit. Finally, a middle-ground position on this issue is possible; some
lower courts, for example, have approached the question of whether a
constructive discharge amounts to a tangible employment action on a case-
by-case basis. 1
02
1. Constructive Discharges Are Not Tangible Employment Actions
The leading case holding that constructive discharges are not tangible
employment actions is Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad,10 3 a
Second Circuit case brought by a woman electrician who quit her job after
being subjected to unwanted sexual touchings by her supervisor and hostile
treatment by her male co-workers. This was a case in which the
categorization of the harassment as constituting a mere hostile environment
was crucial to. the outcome. Because the plaintiff failed to report the
incidents, ultimately the employer was able to avoid liability by
establishing the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
The Caridad court did not believe that a constructive discharge
qualified as a tangible employment action because it was not a harm that
was invariably caused by supervisors. The court reasoned that "[c]o-
workers as well as supervisors can cause the constructive discharge of an
employee"' 0 4 and cited a passage from Ellerth'°5 that distinguished the
kinds of harms that could be inflicted by co-workers from those harms that
are distinctively associated with the official power of the supervisor.
Additionally, the court stressed that a constructive discharge was not an
official act of the enterprise, "[a]nd unlike demotion, discharge, or similar
economic sanctions, an employee's constructive discharge is not ratified or
approved by the employer."' 0 6 Finally, the court noted that, although the
plaintiff in Ellerth alleged that she had been constructively discharged, the
101. See infra text accompanying notes 112-24.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 125-35.
103. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
104. Id. at 294.
105. The Caridad court said:
A co-worker can break a co-worker's arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has
regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive
conduct. But one co-worker ... cannot dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote
another .... The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent
to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.
Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)).
106. Id.
[Vol. 77:307
TITLE VII'S MIDLIFE CRISIS
Supreme Court seemed to proceed on the assumption that the plaintiff had
not suffered a tangible employment action and that the only debatable issue
in the case was whether unfulfilled threats should trigger strict liability. 0 7
Caridad's short treatment of the proper categorization of the
constructive discharge claim is formalist and turns on a characterization of
the constructive discharge claim that purports to fit all cases, regardless of
the facts. The court seemed most persuaded by its view of the nature of the
constructive discharge claim in the abstract, as a kind of hybrid claim that
conceivably could flow from all intolerable working conditions, whether
imposed by supervisors or co-workers. That the plaintiff in the actual case
before it alleged that she quit primarily because of the actions of her
supervisor was not dispositive. Instead, the court focused on the
hypothetical case in which co-workers or third parties are responsible for a
plaintiffs resignation. The court read Ellerth as laying down a bright-line
rule that disallowed the affirmative defense only in the type of case which,
by its very nature, involved abuse by supervisors. The conceptual move in
Caridad was first to emphasize the uniqueness of constructive discharge as
an economic harm not invariably caused by supervisors and then to place it
in the residual hostile environment category.
Caridad has been followed by several district courts.10 8 These courts
have emphasized the lack of official action in constructive discharge cases.
They have stressed the unique nature of constructive discharge cases in
which it is the employee, rather than the employer, who makes the decision
to resign, and often there is "no documentation, no review, and no' use of
internal procedures."' 1 9 In addition to this formalist argument, a few courts
have offered a policy rationale for categorizing constructive discharge as a
hostile environment claim rather than a tangible employment action. These
courts reason that if employers were vicariously liable for constructive
discharge claims, employees could "convert a hostile environment claim
107. Id.
108. See Morton v. Steven Ford-Mercury of Augusta, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1244 (D. Kan. 2001);
Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594-95 (D.S.C. 1999); Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1999). See also Alberter v. McDonald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (D.
Nev. 1999) (holding that constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action, without citing
Caridad); EEOC v. Barton Protective Servs., 47 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59-60 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding, prior to
Caridad, that constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action); Willie v. Hunkar Labs., 724
N.E.2d 492, 505 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (Gorman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority assumes that
constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action). In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth
Circuit cited the rule in Caridad with approval, but concluded that the plaintiff had not established a
constructive discharge in any event. Turner v. Dowbrands, Inc., No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599, at *I-
6 (6th Cir. June 26, 2000).
109. Scott, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 595.
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into a constructive discharge claim simply by resigning without first
seeking redress ... ."110 In their view, such an opportunity would
substantially undermine the affirmative defense and "gut the
Ellerth/Faragher goal of encouraging sensible grievance procedures.""'
The courts' treatment of the policy rationale for allowing the affirmative
defense has, however, been quite brief and cursory. Notably lacking is an
analysis of how the onerous proof requirements of constructive discharge,
aside from the Ellerth defense, might affect a plaintiff's decision to quit her
job, or any discussion of how the remedial consequences of constructive
discharge, specifically the statutory duty to mitigate damages, might play
into a plaintiff s weighing of her options.
2. Constructive Discharges Are Tangible Employment Actions
The leading case holding that a constructive discharge is a tangible
employment action is Suders v. Easton,112 the case taken up by the U.S.
Supreme Court that will ultimately resolve the conflict in the lower courts.
Suders is a Third Circuit case involving harassment of a woman employed
by the Pennsylvania State police. It was decided nearly three years after
Caridad and represents the most extensive judicial treatment of the
issue. " 3 By the time Suders was decided, it had become increasingly clear
that the outcome of cases could turn on the categorization of the
constructive discharge claim.
Suders responds to both the formalist and policy arguments presented
in Caridad and its progeny. Overall, the opinion emphasizes the actual
effect of the harassment on the plaintiff, rather than the abstract nature of
the claim of constructive discharge.
Suders first took issue with the narrow definition of "tangible
employment action" as an action that by its nature can only be inflicted by
a supervisor. In the Third Circuit's view, the fact that, in a hypothetical
case, co-workers could force an employee into resigning was "beside the
point."' 1 4  The court reasoned that co-workers were as capable as
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Jones v. USA Petroleum Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1384 (S.D. Ga. 1998)). See
also Barton Protective Servs., 47 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
112. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Pa. State Police v.
Suders, 72 U.S.L.W. 3105 (U.S. Dec. 1,2003).
113. The Suders opinion drew heavily on the analysis presented in Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F.
Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Iowa 2000). The Eighth Circuit followed Cherry and held that a constructive
discharge was a tangible employment action. See also Jaros v. Lodgenet Entm't Corp., 294 F.3d 960,
966 (8th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2001).
114. Suders, 325 F.3d at 457.
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supervisors of being the perpetrators of tangible employment actions and
did not limit tangible employment actions to such events traditionally
associated with supervisors, such as hirings, firings, or demotions.' 5 For
the Third Circuit, the term "tangible employment action" was a "flexible
concept" that could encompass "the form of subtle discrimination not
easily categorized as a formal discharge or demotion."" 6  Under this
approach, the touchstone of a tangible employment action is the nature of
the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, namely, a "significant change in
employment status." 1
17
In contrast to Caridad's formalist approach, which turns on the
abstract nature of the constructive discharge claim, Suders is more realist in
approach because it stresses actual effects. The court was most persuaded
by the fact that a constructive discharge had precisely the same impact on
the employee as a formal discharge since, by definition, a constructive
discharge transforms the status of the employee from "employed" to
"terminated" and causes economic harm. 118 Under the Suders approach,
the fact that it is the employee, not the employer, who takes the final action
by quitting does not make it qualitatively different from other discharges.
Suders's response to the argument that a constructive discharge should
not be regarded as a tangible employment action because it does not
constitute "an official act of the enterprise"' 9 relies heavily on the
substantive law of constructive discharge. The court stressed that it was a
"fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that a constructive discharge,
once proved, operates as a functional equivalent of an actual termination"
and "becomes, for all intents and purposes, the act of the employer." 120 It
regarded the specialized test for proving constructive discharge-
specifically, proof of intolerable working conditions that make it
reasonably foreseeable that an employee would resign-as tantamount to a
showing that the employer ratified or approved the action. The court
believed that even though it is the employee who tenders her resignation,
legal proof that suffices to establish the discharge, in the eyes of the law,
also ties the act to the employer for purposes of vicarious liability. In
115. Id. ("[M]any tangible employment actions may be perpetrated by either supervisors or co-
workers. After all, supervisors and co-workers alike can make obscene gestures, lewd comments,
sexual propositions, or steal another employee's clients.").
116. Id. at 456.
117. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
118. One exception to this result would be if the employee immediately secures a new job with the
same or better compensation.
119. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
120. Suders, 325 F.3d at 458.
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essence, proof of the substantive elements of constructive discharge
establishes that the act is fairly attributable to the employer, presumably
without further reference to the law of agency or the law of sexual
harassment. 121
Suders also disputed the notion that only actions documented in
official records and subject to review by higher level supervisors could
qualify as tangible employment actions. The court was concerned that such
a narrow view would exclude the classic quid pro quo case in which an
employee decides to submit to a supervisor's demand to have sex in order
to retain her job. Despite the lack of official documentation in such a case,
the court believed that the supervisor "invoked the official authority of the
enterprise" when he made the explicit threats. Likewise, in a constructive
discharge case, the court reasoned that "when a. supervisor creates a hostile
work environment so severe that an employee has no alternative but to
resign, the official power of the enterprise is brought to bear on the
constructive discharge." 122
Finally, the Suders court offered a- policy rationale for treating
constructive discharges as tangible employment actions on a par with other
discharges. Failure to do so, in the court's opinion, "could have the
perverse effect of discouraging an employer from actively pursuing
remedial measures and of possibly encouraging intensified harassment."'123
In other words, employers would be able to accomplish indirectly, and
perhaps in a more abusive fashion, what they may not be able to do
directly. The court was concerned that if it ruled otherwise and allowed
employers to assert the affirmative defense in constructive discharge cases,
there would be little impetus for employers to be "watchful of sexual
harassment at the earliest possible moment," so as not to lose their legal
defense should the victim feel compelled to resign. In contrast to Caridad,
121. One state court decision interpreting state antidiscrimination laws, decided before Suders,
followed the same reasoning, treating constructive discharges like actual discharges. See Champion v.
Nationwide Sec., Inc., 545 N.W.2d 596, 600 (Mich. 1996) ("It is well established that the law does not
differentiate between employees who are actually discharged and those who are constructively
discharged.... [Olnce individuals establish their constructive discharge, they are treated as if their
employer had actually fired them.").
122. Suders, 325 F.3d at 459. In any event, the Third Circuit pointed out that it is not always the
case that there is no documentation or review of resignations, whether they are classified as constructive
discharges or voluntary quits. Although "the termination will look to the supervisor's superiors like a
voluntary quit," the critical fact is the importance of an employee being taken off the payrolls. The
courts reasoned that since "there is always some paperwork involved in an employee's quitting, the
higher-ups in the company will have some ability to monitor constructive discharges ..... Id. (quoting
Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 515 (7th Cir. 1997)).
123. Id. at 461.
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the Suders court did not worry that plaintiffs would rely on constructive
discharge doctrine as an excuse to quit and bypass the employer's
grievance policy. It felt that the stringent substantive requirements for
proving a constructive discharge would make it "highly unlikely that
employees will walk off the job at the first sign of harassment and expect to
prevail under Title VII.' 124 Instead, Suders expressed the opposite concern
that if vicarious liability were denied in constructive discharge cases,
employers would be able to convert a disparate treatment claim for
discriminatory discharge into a hostile environment claim, thereby avoiding
strict liability and the incentive strict liability creates for employers to
screen, train, and stand behind the acts of supervisors.
3. Some Constructive Discharges Are Tangible Employment Actions
Most courts have not yet subscribed to either of the majority positions
and have yet to commit themselves on the categorization of constructive
discharge. In a few of the lower court cases, moreover, it is possible to
discern a third approach to constructive discharge that takes a middle-
ground position, classifying some, but not all, constructive discharges as
tangible employment actions. So far, this middle-ground position has been
articulated in cases involving non-sexual forms of harassment and
discrimination that produce economic injury prior to the time of the
plaintiff's resignation. In these cases, the tangible, economic loss
preceding the constructive discharge has prompted the courts to regard the
constructive discharge as a tangible harm as well.
One important case is Durham Life Insurance Co. v. Evans,125 decided
in the Third Circuit before Suders. The plaintiff in Evans was a female
insurance sales agent who was subjected to sexual and non-sexual forms of
harassment before leaving the firm. She alleged that she had been stripped
of the support she needed to do her job by hostile supervisors who also
denigrated her verbally and touched her in a sexually offensive manner.
Initially, the non-sexual harassment in Evans took the form of assigning
plaintiff a disproportionate number of lapsed policies that had the effect of
depressing her pay by fifty percent. It then escalated to taking away her
office and secretary and depriving her of essential client files she needed to
maintain her policies.
124. Id.
125. Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999).
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In his opinion for the Third Circuit panel, 126 Judge Edward Becker
concluded that the loss of the plaintiffs office, the dismissal of her
secretary, the missing files, and the assignment of lapsed policies were all
tangible employment actions. 127 Taken together, these conditions justified
the plaintiffs decision to quit because they met the standard of
intolerability for constructive discharge. This determination entitled the
plaintiff to recover a sizeable award for backpay, in addition to the amount
she recovered for the mental distress she suffered as a result of the
defendant's harassment. 128 The court was careful to note, however, that it
was not establishing "a blanket rule that any constructive discharge is a
tangible employment action," 129 but merely holding that, in this instance,
"the tangible adverse actions ... would foreseeably have led a reasonable
person to resign." 130
Although he did not elaborate on this point, Judge Becker's opinion
seemed to turn on the fact that the discriminatory actions taken by the
supervisor prior to the time the plaintiff quit produced tangible economic
consequences and thus, in and of themselves, qualified as a "significant
change in employment status" under the Ellerth/Faragher test.1 31  The
court did not specify how it would classify a constructive discharge claim
emanating from a hostile environment that consisted exclusively of
"intangible" sexual harassment that did not produce a direct economic
injury.
The Evans case-by-case approach has been followed by several courts,
some finding that the constructive discharge did not amount to a tangible
employment action. 132  One case, for example, refused to find a tangible
employment action when the plaintiff quit after being sexually pursued by
her boss. 133  The harassment that preceded the alleged constructive
126. No opinion in Evans commanded a majority. Judge Leonard Garth took the position that
because the plaintiff proved a constructive discharge, she had proved a tangible employment action for
which the employer was vicariously liable, essentially adopting the approach that the Third Circuit
would later embrace in Suders. Id. at 149 n.5. Judge Joseph Weis stated that he would allow the
EllerthlFaragher defense in "mixed" cases of sexual and non-sexual harassment, but found the
employer's grievance procedure inadequate in this case. Id. at 161-62 (Weis, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 153.
128. The plaintiff recovered $310,156 in lost earnings and fringe benefits and $100,000 for
emotional distress. Id. at 144, 161.
129. Id. at 155 n.1 1.
130. Id.
131. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
132. See Mallinson-Montague v. Pocmick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding a
tangible employment action preceding the plaintiffs termination, but no constructive discharge).
133. Elmasry v. Veith, No. 98-696-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340, at *1 (D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2000)
(unpublished opinion).
(Vol. 77:307
TITLE VII'S MIDLIFE CRISIS
discharge was mostly of the sexual variety: The plaintiffs boss made
sexual comments to her, tried to get her to kiss him, frightened her by his
persistence, and embarrassed her because she believed that others might
think they were sexually involved. The court read Evans as requiring a
finding that the tangible act be "an official act of the enterprise" and
concluded that the plaintiff had not "experienced an official company act
tantamount to a tangible employment action." 134 In addition to finding no
economic harm stemming from the harassment that preceded the
constructive discharge, the court seemed to treat sexualized harassment as
"unofficial," even when it came from a supervisor and prompted the
plaintiff to quit her job. It contrasted the sexual pursuit the plaintiff
experienced in that case with the non-sexual harassment in Evans and
concluded that the sexual harassment was less tangible and egregious than
Evans, without going so far as to say that it was non-job-related. This case
suggests that it would be difficult to establish a tangible employment action
when the constructive discharge emanates from harassment that is sexual in
nature and appears to the court to be more personal than official or job-
related.
The remedial implications of the case-by-case approach are not easy
to trace. When the acts that precede the plaintiffs resignation produce
economic harm, in and of themselves, the plaintiff presumably may sue for
two distinct periods of economic loss, namely, the period before and after
termination of employment. In addition, in such a case, the plaintiff may
assert a claim for emotional distress stemming from the pre-termination
harassment that produced her resignation and conceivably may also seek
recovery for any post-termination emotional distress she suffered as a result
of her unemployment. Evans seemed to treat both the pre-termination
economic loss (i.e., loss of compensation from being assigned lapsed
policies) and the post-termination economic loss (i.e., loss of backpay) as
part of the claim for constructive discharge. The court did not limit the
134. Id. at *15-16. The court did not consider whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged
because "even if she were constructively discharged, that discharge does not rise to the level of a
tangible employment action." Id. at *15-16. It is not clear why the court believed that its conclusion as
to the tangible employment action issue vitiated the plaintiffs constructive discharge claim.
Conceivably, the plaintiff could have prevailed on the constructive discharge claim, even if it were not
classified as a tangible employment action, if the plaintiff established the substantive elements of the
constructive discharge claim and the employer was unsuccessful in establishing the EllerthlFaragher
defense. Curiously, the court allowed the plaintiffs hostile environment claim to proceed to trial,
concluding that the employer had not established the EllerthlFaragher defense as a matter of law. Id. at
*25-28. Because the opinion did specify whether the plaintiff sought backpay, however, it is not clear
whether the plaintiff would have gained any additional relief by pursuing a constructive discharge
claim.
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constructive discharge damages to the loss of backpay; it instead treated the
pre-termination economic loss as inseparable from the damages attributable
to the constructive discharge. The court also allowed the plaintiff to
recover for emotional distress. Significantly, Evans apparently regarded
this element of damage as part of the constructive discharge claim and as
not being subject to the Ellerth/Faragher defense. It did not require the
plaintiff to establish a claim for hostile environment in order to secure the
emotional distress award. Thus, once the constructive discharge was
classified as a tangible employment action, the court allowed all damages
under that rubric, whether for economic or noneconomic losses.' 35
III. DISSECTING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
The three approaches to the proper characterization of the constructive
discharge claim that have surfaced in the lower courts are preliminary in
the sense that they do not yet offer a way to integrate the substantive law of
constructive discharge into the law of harassment. Nor do they give any
definitive guidance as to how the precise elements of damages should be
matched with the substantive claims. Even at this stage, however, it is
possible to extract from these cases the pivotal questions that will likely
frame any subsequent analysis of this vexing doctrinal issue. The
following section elaborates on the reasoning of the lower courts by
analyzing the constructive discharge issue along five doctrinal axes that
track the main boundary lines of Title VII's frameworks for litigating
individual claims of discrimination.
A. TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT ACTION/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
The split in the courts over the proper characterization of the
constructive discharge claim is understandable because, at least
superficially, a plausible case can be made for either position. This is
because the constructive discharge claim indeed seems to reside at the
boundary or cusp of the categorical divide between tangible employment
actions and hostile environment claims. A constructive discharge is not the
classic type of tangible employment action consisting of a discharge by a
135. The Evans solution to remedies does not invariably flow from a case-by-case approach to
classifying constructive discharges as tangible employment actions. Because the case-by-case approach
scrutinizes the events preceding the plaintiffs termination and distinguishes non-sexual, tangible
actions from sexual, intangible actions, this method might suggest that only the tangible injuries-the
economic losses, both pre- and post-termination-ought to be recoverable in the tangible employment
action/constructive discharge claim, relegating emotional losses exclusively to the hostile environment
action.
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supervisor in which economic harm flows from official action. Nor,
however, is a constructive discharge the classic hostile environment case in
which the plaintiff remains in her job and suffers noneconomic harm of the
sort that comes with working in a discriminatory environment. To my
mind, there is nothing in the Ellerth/Faragher definition of a tangible
employment action that satisfactorily resolves the classification quandary.
Insofar as the division between tangible employment actions and mere
hostile environments constructs a line between formal and informal action
of supervisors, employers' arguments that constructive discharges should
not be classified as tangible employment actions seem strong. In this
respect, constructive discharges are like other constructive conditions that
are not found in the formal structures and policies of an organization.
Employers may argue, with some force, that the hostile environment claim
is in reality a claim that imposes liability for constructive conditions: Under
relevant Supreme Court precedents, 136 severe or pervasive harassment is
treated as a constructive condition of employment and is actionable under
Title VII's ban on discriminatory "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment." 137 Under this line of argument, the Supreme
Court can be seen as having made the decision to erect more exacting proof
requirements with respect to liability for constructive conditions-both in
terms of quantum of harm suffered by the employee and the requisite
showing of employer responsibility-than it has for cases involving
explicit discriminatory terms and conditions. It thus makes sense to
assimilate constructive discharge cases to other hostile environment cases
in which there has been no deployment of official power or change in the
formal structures or policies of the employer.
On the other hand, insofar as the division between tangible
employment actions and mere hostile environment claims turns on the
distinction between economic and noneconomic harms, the plaintiffs'
arguments that constructive discharges should be classified as tangible
employment actions are more persuasive. The very recognition of the
claim for constructive discharge, under Title VII and other fields of law,
signals the need to provide a vehicle for recovery of the substantial
economic harm that can sometimes flow from abuse of informal power
wielded by supervisors. Under this line of argument, the Supreme Court
136. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786
(1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57,63-67(1986).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2000).
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precedents may be viewed as placing a higher priority on the recovery of
economic loss-the kind of harm most readily associated with
employment-related injuries. The greater proof requirements of the hostile
environment case, plaintiffs would argue, stem from the Court's greater
reluctance to permit recovery for intangible harms-the kind of harm most
often linked to private tort claims outside the employment realm. Because
constructive discharge undeniably causes economic loss and
unemployment is arguably the most tangible loss an employee can suffer
from discrimination in employment, it makes sense to assimilate
constructive discharges to other types of discharges and treat them as
tangible employment actions.
These two opposing lines of argument mirror the approaches taken in
Caridad and Suders. Caridad's emphasis on the fact that constructive
discharges are not invariably caused by supervisors and do not represent
the official act of the enterprise places primary weight on the
"constructive" feature of constructive discharge. In contrast, Suders's
emphasis on the economic nature of the harm inflicted by constructive
discharge places primary weight on the "discharge" feature of constructive
discharge and downplays the informal nature of the supervisory action.
The choice between the two approaches seems to turn on which feature of
the unique constructive discharge claim is selected as more essential to, or
representative of, the claim-a choice that was not made by the Supreme
Court in Ellerth/Faragher.
As an abstract matter, neither standard provides a secure footing for
characterization of the constructive discharge claim. Both the
formal/informal distinction and the economic/noneconomic distinction are
unstable categories that tend to break down in practice, making it
precarious to ground the choice of standard on such logical analysis alone.
Like so many other important interpretations of Title VII, the choice of a
standard for constructive discharge claims is a matter of judgment that
should be informed by policy considerations and rationalized within the
larger frameworks of Title VII doctrine.
To demonstrate the instability of the formal/informal distinction, posit
a case138 in which an employee asserts that she has been subjected to a
sexually hostile environment. She complains to her employer, urging
management to discipline the harassers and take other steps to change the
138. This hypothetical is based on the facts of Pollard v. E.L du Pont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d
933 (6th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 532 U.S. 843 (2001). The trial judge awarded the plaintiff backpay, without
mentioning constructive discharge.
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climate of the workplace. The employee subsequently goes on medical
leave and, prior to her scheduled return, is asked to attend a return-to-work
meeting with officials from the company. At the meeting, she again insists
that the employer rectify the situation and is told that no changes will be
made. When she refuses to return to work under those conditions, she is
fired. Under those circumstances, should we treat the employee's
discharge as an ordinary discharge? Or is this really a case of constructive
discharge because, by refusing to return to work, the employee has in effect
quit in protest?
If the touchstone of a constructive discharge is its lack of formality,
compared to an actual discharge that entails some formal action, the
discharge in the hypothetical case should be regarded as an actual
discharge, given that the employee was indeed fired by an official of the
company. When we scratch the surface a bit, however, we can see that the
legality of the firing in this case will likely turn on whether the company
had a right to refuse the employee's request to correct the allegedly hostile
environment and whether the employee was justified in refusing to return
to work until the changes had been made. In other words, it is likely that a
court analyzing this case would gauge the legality of the firing by reference
to the standards for constructive discharge (i.e., whether conditions were so
intolerable that a reasonable employee would quit under the
circumstances). This suggests that the case is really a constructive
discharge case, despite the formal act of firing.
The point of this hypothetical is to show that formality may not
always be an unfailing guide to characterizing a case as either an actual or a
constructive discharge. 139  Such instability at the margins of a legal
category would not pose a problem, of course, if the imposition of
vicarious liability (or conversely, the availability of the affirmative
defense) did not depend solely on the characterization of the case as either
an actual discharge or a constructive discharge case. In the hypothetical
case, the formalist approach taken by Caridad suggests that vicarious
liability should be imposed, but leaves us without a standard for
determining the legality of the firing, since presumably it would be
impermissible to borrow the intolerability standard associated with
constructive discharge to resolve an actual discharge case.
139. See McGregory v. Crest/Hughes Techs., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1087-88 (S.D. Iowa 2001)
(holding that, as a matter of law, an employee had voluntarily quit after being absent three days, despite
a formal letter of separation from the employer); Mich. Dep't of Civil Rights v. Edward W. Sparrow
Hosp. Ass'n, 377 N.W.2d 755, 763-64 (Mich. 1985) (debating whether a plaintiff who was sent home
for improper dress was fired or quit).
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However, what seems to be at the crux of the hypothetical case, and
perhaps in all cases of constructive discharge, is a question of attribution of
responsibility, rather than simply the proper characterization of the nature
of the action. Underneath the categorization dilemma lies a contest over
who should be held responsible for the loss of the employee's job-the
employee or the employer. In the hypothetical case, it seems fair to
conclude that the employee should prevail and her employer should be held
responsible only if the working conditions were such that they would have
afforded the employee or other reasonable employees justification to quit
their job. That the employer actually fired the plaintiff strikes me as
largely irrelevant in the hypothetical case, given that employers generally
have the right to fire employees who refuse to work. Simply because a
supervisor's decision to fire an employee might be determinative in another
case, and might make it easy to attribute responsibility for the termination
solely to the employer, does not mean that such attribution is justified
whenever an employer takes the final step and discharges an employee.' 
40
Once the artificiality of the formal/informal distinction is so exposed, it
seems unwise to attach vicarious liability automatically to all actual
discharges, and to deny vicarious liability in all cases of constructive
discharge, without further examining the policies at stake in attributing
responsibility for the discharge to either party.
Similarly, the economic/noneconomic distinction that supports
classifying constructive discharges as tangible employment actions is not a
simple description of the nature of a plaintiff's injury, but likely also masks
difficult questions of attribution of responsibility. It is significant that the
court in Suders characterized constructive discharges as inflicting "direct
economic harm."' 14 1 Although it is undeniable that discharges of any sort-
whether actual or constructive-cause economic harm, it is debatable
whether the economic harm associated with constructive discharges should
be regarded as "direct." In a case in which a supervisor's harassment
mounts to the point that the plaintiff feels she must quit because she can no
longer endure the harassment, it is the psychological pressure placed on the
plaintiff that brings about the economic injury. In this respect, the
140. In fact, to take this argument to an absurd level, we could hold an employee responsible for
not showing up for work and insisting on working even after she is fired. Because we do not require
employees to give their employer such a second chance, however, we attribute the unemployment to the
employer's action in firing the employee, even though we do not know whether the employer would
have changed its mind and allowed the plaintiff to return to work, if only she had asked.
141. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 457-58 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101
F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172-73 (N.D. Iowa 2000)).
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economic harm may seem more indirect than directly caused by the
harassment.
In such a case, however, it may be fair to characterize the economic
harm as "direct" if we can confidently place the blame for the plaintiff's
response on the supervisor. If, for example, the supervisor's action is such
that we would have expected an employee to quit in response and we do
not see the employee's action as unforeseeable or as breaking the chain of
causation, we are more likely to regard the harm as direct and
simultaneously to attribute the termination to the supervisor rather than to
the employee. To use a tort analogy, the economic harm is likely to be
labeled as direct if the supervisor's action is viewed as the proximate cause
of the harm and the employee's action in quitting is not regarded as a
superseding cause. Just as normative judgments about the behavior of the
parties lie beneath assessments of proximate cause in tort law,1 42 it is likely
that normative judgments also affect whether the employer is seen as
inflicting direct economic harm in a case of alleged constructive discharge.
In each context, the question of who should be held responsible is
intertwined with, and inseparable from, the question of who caused the
harm and the description of the nature of the harm itself. If the employer is
deemed responsible, we are apt to describe the harm as direct economic
harm; if the employee is deemed responsible, we are apt to see and describe
the harm as psychological in nature, causing only incidental or indirect
economic harm.
Because constructive discharges are not easily categorized as either
tangible employment actions or pure hostile environment claims, it is
necessary to dig deeper into the structure of the Title VII liability scheme to
seek a way out of the category dilemma. Both "tangible employment
actions" and "hostile environment" are terms used to classify the two main
types of harassment. When the frame is expanded beyond harassment to
include other types of biased behavior, we find that discrete acts of
discrimination, such as biased discharges, are typically regarded as
"disparate treatment," while a continuing course of discriminatory conduct,
particularly if it consists of sexual conduct, is most often labeled
"harassment."'' 43 Whether a constructive discharge should be classified as
142. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29, at 2-4 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003);
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 180, at 443 (2000) ("The proximate cause issue, in spite of the
terminology, is not about causation at all but about the appropriate scope of responsibility.") (internal
footnote omitted); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); MARSHALL S. SHAPO,
PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW § 55.04, at 308-09 (2d ed. 2003).
143. In a case involving the limitations period under Title VII, the Supreme Court has recently
drawn a distinction between disparate treatment claims involving discrete discriminatory acts and
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a form of disparate treatment or as harassment thus provides another way
into the debate.
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT/HARASSMENT
To determine whether a constructive discharge should be assimilated
to an actual discharge and regarded as a kind of disparate treatment, it is
helpful to consider the situation of an employee who is faced with the
prospect of working in a hostile environment. If the employee decides to
stay on the job and oppose the harassment by complaining to management,
she runs the risk that, instead of responding fairly to her grievance, the
employer might retaliate against her, perhaps even discharging her from her
position. In such an eventuality, the employee not only would have a claim
for the emotional distress she suffered from the hostile environment, but
would also be able to assert a claim for retaliatory discharge, seeking
recovery for the economic damages she sustained as a consequence of
losing her job.144 Her situation would be akin to the classic quid pro quo
harassment case in which a supervisor fires an employee for refusing to
have sex with him. Title VII presumably protects the employee from
retaliatory discharge in both contexts. The employer may not fire an
employee who refuses to remain silent about discriminatory conditions or
insist that an employee engage in sex to keep her job. In both cases, it is
the employee's resistance to discriminatory conditions and proposals that
prompts the retaliation. Moreover, both retaliatory dismissal and quid pro
quo harassment clearly result in a tangible employment action-each
consists of an actual discharge and causes economic harm.
In this respect, the tangible employment action framework looks very
much like the general framework used for retaliation claims. Indeed, in
asserting retaliation claims, plaintiffs have long been required to prove that
they suffered "adverse action," 145 similar to the requirement that plaintiffs
prove a tangible employment action to qualify for vicarious liability (with
no affirmative defenses) under Ellerth/Faragher. Most importantly for our
purposes, the retaliatory framework is a variation of the basic disparate
claims of hostile environment. The Court explained that "[h]ostile environment claims are different in
kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
144. Section 704(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee
because "he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice ... or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
145. For a discussion of the courts' varying interpretation of the adverse action requirement in
retaliation cases, see LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 49, § 2.40, at 104-07.
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treatment framework, with its key elements of unequal treatment,
discriminatory intent, and a causal connection between the discriminatory
act and the asserted harm. The retaliation/disparate treatment framework
bears little resemblance to the framework for proving hostile environment
claims, which requires proof of repeated or severe acts of harassment and
does not require the plaintiff to prove that the hostile environment resulted
in a tangible harm.146
The key issue then becomes whether constructive discharges are
sufficiently similar to retaliatory discharges that they should also be
regarded as disparate treatment rather than harassment. In the constructive
discharge situation, of course, the employee faced with a hostile
environment decides to quit, rather than continue to endure the
discriminatory conditions. Her decision not to persist in opposing the
discriminatory conditions arguably distinguishes the constructive discharge
from the prior retaliatory situations. 147
Assume, for example, that the employee quits when management fails
to remedy the hostile environment after she complains. The plaintiff
alleges that she was constructively discharged because she could not
reasonably continue to work under such intolerable conditions. If the
plaintiffs claim of constructive discharge is credited, it could be argued
that her resignation is the equivalent of forced submission. Rather than
actively resist the harassment by staying on the job and protesting, the
plaintiff in the constructive discharge case has chosen to do what her
employer wants her to do, namely, to resign; and, as a consequence, she has
been forced to give up a job she otherwise would have kept. By resigning,
moreover, the employee in the constructive discharge case relieves the
employer of taking the final step to end the plaintiffs resistance to the
hostile environment. The practical effect of the plaintiff's quitting means
that the employer will not have to retaliate against her by discharging her.
For plaintiffs who succeed in proving that they had little choice but to
resign, it is not hard to imagine that resistance on their part could well have
146. See, e.g., Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2000) (drawing a sharp distinction
between retaliation and hostile environment claims). Although some commentators classify all
harassment cases (including hostile environment claims) as disparate treatment cases, the courts do not
apply Hicks's disparate treatment framework in hostile environment cases. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). It thus makes more sense to regard harassment as a kind of intentional
discrimination with a separate framework for liability.
147. Of course, it is possible that an employee could stay on the job but decide not to complain
about the continuing discrimination and harassment. Although her silence in such a case could also be
interpreted as "submission," particularly in contrast to the employee who quits, such an employee
retains the possibility of resisting in the future by staying on the job.
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resulted in a retaliatory dismissal by an employer bent on preserving
discriminatory working conditions. 148 Plaintiffs could thus argue that there
is little meaningful difference between constructive discharge and
retaliatory discharge and that they should be treated the same under the
law.
A plaintiff who has been constructively discharged might also
analogize her situation to an employee who submits to quid pro quo sexual
harassment. In both situations, the employer makes an illegal demand and
renders it impossible for the plaintiff to stay on the job on her own terms.
In the constructive discharge situation, the employer demands that the
plaintiff continue to work in a hostile environment; in the quid pro quo
case, the employer demands that the plaintiff engage in sex. Although it
may seem strange to equate the case of a woman who gives in to her
supervisor's demand for sex to that of a woman who quits when faced with
intolerable working conditions, in each situation the employee capitulates
by behaving the way the supervisor wants her to behave. From the
employee's perspective, the powerlessness that accompanies either act of
submission may feel the same, whether the employee gives into her
supervisor's desire for sex or accedes to her supervisor's desire for her to
quit her job.
Analogizing constructive discharge cases to forced submission cases,
however, does not solve the legal classification problem. The confusion
that currently surrounds constructive discharge cases also clouds the
treatment of cases of quid pro quo harassment, where the plaintiff submits
rather than resists. Prior to Ellerth/Faragher, it was clear that vicarious
liability would be imposed in all quid pro quo cases, whether there was
retaliation or submission. 149 In this vital respect, such cases were treated
like other disparate treatment cases. Under Ellerth/Faragher, however, it is
not clear how submission cases will now be treated.
The problem arises from the fact that by submitting, rather than
resisting, the plaintiff arguably prevents (or preempts) the employer from
imposing a tangible job detriment. Take, for example, a case in which the
148. In some cases, of course, a supervisor might not be willing to take that final step of actually
discharging the employee in retaliation for her opposition to the hostile environment. The fact that such
cases exist, however, does not defeat the argument that an employer who sets out to force the plaintiff
to quit is likely to retaliate against the employee who refuses to do so.
149. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 512-14 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding an employer vicariously
liable for granting an employee's leave requests after the employee submitted to sexual conduct);
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777-79 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a quid pro quo claim is
equally valid for a plaintiff who submits to a threat and thus suffers no economic harm).
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employer threatens to fire the plaintiff if she refuses to have sex with him,
and the plaintiff reluctantly agrees to the sex to keep her job. The loss
suffered in such a case is the loss of the plaintiff's sexual autonomy, rather
than economic loss associated with unemployment. The employer may
argue that, in a submission case, the plaintiffs loss is intangible and does
not change her job status, pointing out that she has remained employed
throughout. Under this reasoning, submission cases are like cases of
unfulfilled threats in that both fail to produce a negative employment
consequence. Under EllerthIFaragher, the argument is that neither is
actionable unless the plaintiff proves liability under the hostile environment
framework, complete with the employer's affirmative defense.
In a significant new ruling, however, the Second Circuit has taken the
position that forcing an employee to submit to sexual activity as a condition
of retaining the employee's job is a tangible employment action and gives
rise to vicarious liability. In Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,"5 ° the
plaintiff was sexually abused by her supervisor on a weekly basis. The
abuse was particularly severe: He bit, kissed, and fondled her alone in his
office, and he forced her to unzip his pants and ejaculated on her.'51 For a
time, she endured this harassment because he threatened to fire her if she
did not comply. 152 She also unsuccessfully tried to avoid him by working
during hours when he was not supposed to be present. 153 Despite the
severity of the harassment, Jin lost at the trial level because the jury
concluded that the employer had proven the affirmative defense. 1
54
The Second Circuit reversed and agreed with the plaintiff that forced
submission should be treated as a tangible employment action, even though
the employer never carried through with his threats to discharge her
because the plaintiff decided to comply. In contrast to its stance in
Caridad, the court took a realist approach and reasoned that the supervisor
had effectively used his power over Jin to force her to comply. Even
though the supervisor's power could be considered informal, in that it had
not been explicitly ratified by the employer, the court chose to regard it as
"an act of the employer" because the supervisor had "brought the official
power of the enterprise to bear on Jin by explicitly threatening to fire her if
she did not submit and then allowing her to retain her job based on her
150. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 88-89.
152. Id. at 89.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 90-91.
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submission."' 55 For the Second Circuit, as long as the consequence of the
supervisor's action was "tangible," it need not be "adverse" in its negative
sense. It sufficed that the plaintiff had received a job benefit by submitting,
which the court characterized as the retention of her job.156
The Jin court acknowledged, however, that its ruling would have been
different if Jin had resisted her supervisor's demands and the supervisor
had then backed down and not followed through with his threats.'
57
Putting the plaintiff to the hard choice of whether to resist or comply is no
longer enough to invoke vicarious liability, as it was when the quid pro quo
terminology was first used by the courts. Since Ellerth/Faragher, the
crucial issue is not whether the supervisor threatens to tie sex to job
retention, benefits, or detriments, but how the courts characterize the
upshot of the supervisor's illegal demands. Notably, Jin did not require the
loss the plaintiff suffered to be strictly economic in nature158 and was
willing to characterize retention of a job as an employment benefit. 159
However, we can expect other courts to read Ellerth/Faragher as requiring
that a plaintiff demonstrate that she suffered an adverse change in
employment status before imposing vicarious liability.
The difficulty in developing a compelling rationale to retain vicarious
liability in submission cases after Ellerth/Faragher is not surprising. It
flows from the problem of carving out some types of sexual harassment
and treating them like disparate treatment cases, while relegating the rest of
the sexual harassment cases to the category of hostile environment, even
though both types of cases involve behavior on the part of a supervisor that
is not qualitatively different in terms of its severity or its structure. The
cases at the boundary line-notably, the submission cases and the
constructive discharge cases where plaintiffs give up rather than resist-
simply defy easy categorization.
In sum, similar to the classification dilemma surrounding tangible
employment actions versus hostile environment, constructive discharge
cases do not seem to fall clearly within either the disparate treatment or
155. Id. at 98 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)).
156. Id. at 101. The EEOC had taken a similar position, although is it unclear whether it would
consider simple retention of a job (as opposed to a promotion or raise in pay) as a job benefit. See
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT
BY SUPERVISORS § IVB (1999). Promotions or raises are clearly job benefits, while forced submission
under the threat of firing may be argued to be a noneconomic loss that does not change the plaintiffs
job status.
157. See Jin, 310 F.3d at 96-97.
158. Id. at 96.
159. Id. at 95.
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harassment category. The best argument for treating constructive discharge
cases under the disparate treatment rubric stresses their similarity to other
retaliation cases. However, there is no getting around the fact that, in
contrast to retaliation cases, in constructive discharge cases, it is the
employee herself who makes the crucial decision to quit, and, as a result,
leaves us wondering whether the employer would indeed have taken the
final step to discharge her. The difference is that, in the constructive
discharge situation, the employee plays a role in translating the
psychological harm of harassment into the economic harm of
unemployment. Disparate treatment's alignment with economic loss and
harassment's alignment with noneconomic loss do not tell us what to do
with a hybrid case like constructive discharge, which is neither fish nor
fowl.
Rather than attempt to classify constructive discharge as either
disparate treatment or harassment, it might be useful to focus more directly
on the unique features of the claim. The lower courts that have most
recently grappled with the proper classification of constructive discharge
cases have tended to fasten on one of two distinctive features of the claim
that set it apart from typical disparate treatment or hostile-environment
harassment claims-namely, that the termination is not the result of any
official action on the part of the employer and that the effect is nonetheless
the same economic harm that is felt by employees who have been fired by
more official means. This suggests that another way to approach the
classification dilemma is to expand the frame a bit and ask whether the
focus in Title VII cases should be on the official decisionmaking process or
should emphasize the effects that employer behavior has on employees.
C. PROCESS/EFFECTS
Behind the technical debate about whether constructive discharges are
tangible employment actions lies a more fundamental question about the
proper focus and perspective of Title VII law. One view, exemplified by
the Caridad opinion,1 60 is formalist in approach. It is concerned with
identifying the formal decisions and policies of an organization and
determining whether there is any disparity in treatment along those lines on
grounds prohibited by Title VII (i.e., race, color, national origin, sex, or
religion). The emphasis here is on the decisionmaking process, specifically
the actions and perspectives of those supervisory employees who act on
behalf of the employer. The contrasting view, reflected in the Suders
160. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
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opinion,' 61 is more realist in approach. It is concerned with the actual
effects of employer behavior (whether formal or informal) on employees
and taking into account the perspectives of the targets of the behavior, as
well as those who represent the enterprise. The emphasis on effects, rather
than solely on formal process, is designed to capture more subtle or hidden
forms of discrimination that may nonetheless constitute a significant barrier
to an employee's security or advancement in the workplace.
Neither the history nor the contemporary doctrinal structure of Title
VII provides a clear answer as to whether the primary focus should be on
process or effects in the constructive discharge context. From nearly its
inception, Title VII law has been characterized by a dual emphasis on both
the decisionmaking process and the effects of employer practices and
policies. In the early years, the effects approach was principally identified
with claims of disparate impact, 162 offering plaintiffs what looked like a
considerable advantage to dispense with proof of discriminatory intent.
Disparate treatment claims, on the other hand, centered on ferreting out
discriminatory taints in the decisionmaking process, and the courts became
preoccupied with developing models for proving discriminatory intent
under this theory of liability.
For a variety of reasons, the disparate impact claim has all but
vanished from the scene,163 despite its codification in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act. 164 But that does not mean that the focus on effects has disappeared;
instead, when it arises, the emphasis on effects tends to be embedded in
subsidiary points of doctrine that are nominally within a disparate treatment
framework. In the last decade, a formalist, process-oriented model for
interpreting Title VII has emerged as the dominant model of interpretation
in the courts and commentary. 65  There is still room, however, for an
161. See supra text accompanying notes 112-24.
162. For early commentary on disparate impact theory, see generally Paulette M. Caldwell,
Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PITT. L.
REV. 555 (1985); Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII. Disparate
Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983); Julia
Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title Vii's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985
U. ILL. L. REV. 869 (1985).
163. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1991) (demonstrating that disparate impact cases
accounted for less than two percent of the federal employment discrimination caseload in 1989).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l) (2000).
165. Under the dominant process-oriented model, any disparity in the terms, conditions, or
privileges in employment potentially violates the Act, provided such disparity is attributable to the
employer through the actions of its agents or supervisors. See generally White, supra note 78.
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effects-oriented analysis in particular contexts, and courts continue to shape
the details of Title VII doctrine to accomplish specific policy goals.
The doctrinal developments most pertinent to the resolution of the
constructive discharge dilemma relate to the evolution of the hostile
environment claim. The very first issue the Supreme Court confronted in a
sexual harassment case was whether Title VII coverage was limited to quid
pro quo cases, of harassment in which supervisors imposed an economic
penalty on employees who refused their sexual advances. The Court in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson rejected such a limitation and held that
noneconomic injury as well as economic harm were encompassed within
the broad language of Title ViI's prohibition against discriminatory
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment. 166 While
recognizing the claim for hostile work environment, however, the Court
imposed a threshold requirement that the harassment in such cases must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive," focusing on the level and nature of the
harassing conduct and presumably its effect on the targeted employee.'
67
In a subsequent hostile environment case, the Court made clear that the
severity and pervasiveness of harassment would be judged in part on its
effect on the targets, noting that courts should consider whether the
harassment interferes with an employee's work performance or negatively
affects the employee's psychological well-being.' 
68
This focus on effects embedded within the severe or pervasive
requirement seems largely to favor defendants because it assures that
federal courts will not intervene in employment disputes involving
noneconomic harassment unless there is substantial harm, or at least the
capacity for such harm, as judged by the degree of harassment. In some
cases, this threshold requirement means that clearly provable harassment
may not be actionable. For example, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, the Court indicated that a supervisor's unfulfilled threats to
retaliate against an employee for refusing to accede to sexual advances
would not violate Title VII if the threats were judged not to be severe or
pervasive. 169 As commentators have recognized, 170 this threshold harm
requirement represents a departure from the strict disparate treatment
model that would hold employers liable for any difference in treatment
166. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
167. Id. at 67.
168. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
169. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752-54 (1998).
170. See Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment to Be "Severe or Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms and Conditions" of
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85,90 (2003); White, supra note 78, at 1162.
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based on race or sex. Similar threshold harm requirements have cropped
up in retaliation cases where some courts have insisted that plaintiffs prove
that an employer's discriminatory action resulted in a "materially adverse
action" or constituted an "ultimate employment decision" before allowing a
claim. 171
The courts' recent propensity to use effects analysis to make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prove their case may seem strange to those who
have followed the evolution of Title VII doctrine. Historically, effects
analysis has been associated with an expansive interpretation of civil rights
law, and judges who looked to the effects of an employer's action on
employees were often plaintiff-oriented. The threshold requirement
originally imposed in disparate impact litigation-namely, that a plaintiff
prove that a policy or practice produced a substantial group adverse
impact 172-was not regarded as unduly burdensome to plaintiffs, probably
because it was thought to be a small price to pay in return for having
unintentional discrimination recognized as actionable under federal law. In
contrast, the newly created exceptions for "de minimis" discrimination' 73 in
the harassment and retaliation contexts are judicial inventions for limiting
liability, without a corresponding benefit to plaintiffs. 174  Commentators
arguing for greater protection for plaintiffs now sometimes urge courts to
adopt a formalist approach that covers all forms of disparate treatment,
without regard to the degree of injury. 175
171. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-44 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing varying standards
courts use to define "adverse employment action" in retaliation cases); Ann M. Henry, Employer and
Employee Reasonableness Regarding Retaliation Under the EllerthlFaragher Affirmative Defense, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL FOUND. 553, 560-63 (1999); White, supra note 78, at 1164.
172. Early cases included Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Subsequently, the
courts insisted on more compelling demonstrations of group adverse impact, often requiring
sophisticated statistical demonstrations. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 19-24 (1980).
173. The term "de minimis discrimination" was first coined by Rebecca Hanner White. See
White, supra note 78.
174. It could be argued, however, that proof of discriminatory intent is easier to establish in
harassment cases. In Ellerth, the Court stated that "[s]exual harassment under Title VII presupposes
intentional conduct," perhaps signaling that there need be no further showing of group-based hostility or
animus in this category of cases. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the torrent
of scholarship surrounding the Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523
U.S. 75 (1998), it is still far from clear whether courts will insist that plaintiffs present evidence of a
hostile "state of mind," especially in same-sex harassment cases. See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White,
There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 725 (1999) (arguing that stringent proof of intent does and should apply to sexual
harassment claims).
175. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REV. 1591
(2000); White, supra note 78, at 1191.
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The current split in the lower courts over the proper classification of
constructive discharge cases resembles the old demarcation lines, with the
pro-plaintiff opinion in Suders stressing the actual effects on employees
and the pro-defendant opinion in Caridad emphasizing the formal
decisionmaking process. Because in constructive discharge cases there is
little doubt that the supervisor-caused injury is substantial and material,
however, the inquiry tends to center on the legal significance of formal
versus informal behavior on the part of supervisors. In Caridad and
Suders, the process/effects debate subtly shades into a contest over whether
employers should be held equally accountable for informal conduct on the
part of supervisors that has the same effect as formal actions.
The precedents relevant to the question of whether the focus in Title
VII constructive-discharge cases should be on formal or informal action are
not particularly illuminating. In support of focusing on informal action,
plaintiffs could cite to the Court's ruling in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, which allowed plaintiffs to use disparate impact analysis to challenge
subjective practices that had not been reduced to formal policies. 7 6
Watson rejected the argument that effects analysis should be limited to
objective, formal policies, recognizing that discretionary practices could be
equally as harmful. 177 The case seemed to recognize the need to scrutinize
employer behavior that was not embodied in formal policies to make sure
that employers did not use an "undisciplined system of subjective
decisionmaking" to accomplish results substantially similar to intentional
discrimination. 178  In this respect, Watson lends support to plaintiffs'
argument that employers should be as responsible for constructive
discharges caused by informal discrimination as they are for actual
discharges that consist of formal action. In both contexts, plaintiffs would
argue that the law should be mindful that discriminatory ends can be easily
masked and that effects analysis is needed to guard against less obvious
forms of discrimination that are expressed in informal supervisory
behavior. Whether the question is the applicability of disparate impact
analysis or the proper categorization of constructive discharge cases, a
focus on effects is a tested method for capturing subtle, more contemporary
forms of discrimination.
In response, employers can be expected to point out that the issue in
Watson was whether to allow the plaintiff to invoke disparate impact theory
to challenge the legality of an employer's subjective decisionmaking
176. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 990-91.
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process, and that it did not address the more precise issue of the employer's
vicarious liability in a constructive discharge suit alleging disparate
treatment. Since the Supreme Court first indicated in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson that common-law agency principles should serve as a
guideline to determine the limits of employer responsibility, 179 courts have
understandably been engaged in a process of sorting out supervisory
behavior that the law attributes to the employer and behavior that is
regarded as too personal in nature to be linked to the employer. It is at this
point that the distinction between formal and informal supervisory conduct
comes into play. Employers will argue that whatever role effects analysis
may play in other Title VII contexts, the Supreme Court in Ellerth has
mandated a focus on the formal acts of the enterprise in its interpretation of
agency principles by describing a tangible employment action as "an
official act of the enterprise, a company act." 180 Only in such cases, the
argument goes, will it be clear that the supervisor was aided in
accomplishing his discriminatory objective by his relationship with his
employer. Rebecca Hanner White, for example, has taken such an
approach, arguing that vicarious liability hinges not on the material or
harmful effects of a supervisor's conduct, but on whether such conduct
involves an official action that only supervisors can inflict on their
subordinates. 181 Under this reasoning, paralleling the approach in Caridad,
a crucial distinction is that a supervisor elects to pressure a plaintiff to quit
through the use of informal tactics rather than through a formal discharge
because it is impossible in constructive discharge cases to pinpoint the
moment when the supervisor exercises formal power on behalf of the
employer.
If the outcome of Title VII vicarious-liability cases were dictated
solely by agency principles, arguments such as these, that turn on the
existence of formal, official acts, would be quite compelling. However,
since its decision in Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court has also
been careful to note that agency principles are not the only guideposts in
Title VII law 182 and that other policy considerations may legitimately come
into play in judicial determinations of the limits of employer liability.
Indeed, in fashioning the affirmative defense in Ellerth/Faragher, the Court
did not limit its analysis to agency principles. Instead, it explicitly relied
179. Meritor Spv. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
180. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).
181. White, supra note 78, at 1158.
182. The Court cautioned in Vinson that "such common-law principles may not be transferable in
all their particulars to Title VII ...." Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
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on other policy considerations underlying Title VII, namely, the policy in
favor of conciliation rather than litigation, the policy of encouraging the
development of internal grievance procedures, and the policy of deterring
and preventing harassment by encouraging employees to report harassment
before it becomes severe or pervasive.183 Thus, in resolving difficult
issues, such as the proper treatment of constructive discharge cases, the
Supreme Court precedents indicate that courts are not bound by agency
law, but may also consider the objectives and goals of Title VII as they
craft the details of the doctrine. The resort to policy considerations
authorized by Ellerth/Faragher means that the effects-oriented approach of
Suders might hold up under Title VII, even if the court's treatment of
constructive discharge departs from traditional agency principles.
So far, the policy analysis undertaken by the lower courts in
constructive discharge cases has been thin and has not yet provided a
convincing case for either position. As mentioned earlier,' 84 the principal
policy argument that has emerged for treating constructive discharge cases
as ordinary hostile environment cases (with the affirmative defense) centers
on encouraging potential plaintiffs to report harassment to their employer
and to give the employer the opportunity to correct the problem. The
concern is that if constructive discharges are treated as tangible
employment actions, plaintiffs could convert a hostile environment case
into a tangible employment action simply by resigning, without first
seeking redress from the employer. This echoes the view of the Supreme
Court in Ellerth/Faragher that allowing the affirmative defense fosters the
development of internal grievance procedures.
The competing policy concern articulated by the court in Suders in
favor of imposing vicarious liability (with no affirmative defense)' 85 bears
a strong resemblance to those expressed in disparate impact cases. Similar
to the rationale of Watson, the court in Suders believed that a focus on
effects was needed to prevent supervisors from masking their
discriminatory conduct in order to accomplish indirectly what they could
not do directly.186 When the spotlight is on the supervisor, rather than the
employee, the concern is that unless the law treats constructive discharges
on a par with actual discharges, supervisors will have an incentive to
engage in a course of conduct designed to force an employee to quit in
order to retain the benefits of the affirmative defense.
183. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 105-11.
185. See supra discussion accompanying notes 123-24.
186. See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432,460 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Neither the case precedents of the lower courts nor the policy analyses
provide a clear answer to the question of whether the legal treatment of
constructive discharge should hinge on the formal versus informal nature of
the supervisor's conduct. Although agency law may favor a focus on
formal action, the policy of eradicating covert and subtle as well as overt
discrimination counsels against giving employers a legal incentive to
pressure employees to quit through informal tactics. Moreover, because
even this rather abstract debate about the proper focus and perspective of
Title VII law soon becomes enmeshed in questions of policy, it is perhaps
best to confront the issue more directly and ask whether it is wise as a
matter of law and policy to impose strict liability on employers in this
particular kind of case.
D. STRICT LIABILITY/NEGLIGENCE
The doctrinal dispute over the characterization of the constructive
discharge claim boils down to whether such cases should be governed by
strict liability or negligence principles. This is because, in practice, the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense has proven to be a powerful defense
for employers. Even though the burden of proof rests with the employer,
recent empirical studies indicate that employers are having considerable
success in establishing the defense, often at the summary judgment
stage. 187 Moreover, although technically the availability of the affirmative
defense should not negate the "strictness" of the employer's liability, 188
courts generally apply the affirmative defense to exonerate employers who
act reasonably. Thus, for the most part, when the defense is available, the
case is approached as a negligence case. Strict liability is reserved only for
cases in which the defense is precluded.
Because the most common sexual harassment case is a hostile
environment case and the most common constructive discharge case is one
caused by a sexually hostile environment, it would not be surprising if the
same set of rules were held to govern each type of case. Put another way,
187. See Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social
Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 273, 285-91 (2001); Sherwyn et al., supra note 90, at 1268-69, 1288.
188. Read literally, the affirmative defense should not shield an employer who responds
reasonably to a plaintiffs complaint of harassment, unless the employee also acted unreasonably. In
this respect, the liability framework of EllerthlFaragher is strict, holding non-negligent employers
liable to plaintiffs who take reasonable measures to prevent their own injuries. However, there is
evidence that in such cases-where both the employer and the employee act reasonably-courts stretch
to avoid holding the employer liable, labeling the conduct of even the employee who reports as
unreasonable as a matter of law. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 90, at 1294-95.
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the crucial question becomes whether the law of sexual harassment will
subsume constructive discharge cases, except perhaps for those non-
prototype constructive discharge cases, such as discriminatory demotion
cases, that do not involve sexualized conduct. It thus becomes important to
explain why cases of sexual harassment are often treated differently from
other discrimination cases and to articulate the reasons why courts are more
willing to insulate employers from liability in the harassment context.
Commentators have long noted the disfavored status of sexual
harassment as a cause of action.189 From its inception in the mid-1970s,
courts have been reluctant to view sexual harassment as a bona fide form of
sex discrimination. Early cases dismissed sexual harassment claims as
involving essentially private disputes that bore little relation to
employment-related injuries, such as unequal pay or failure to promote. 190
The negative response of courts likely stemmed from a belief that harassers
were motivated to act out of sexual desire for a particular woman (i.e., it
was personal) and that their conduct was about sex, not about work.
The feminist campaign to recognize sexual harassment as a form of
sex discrimination has vigorously contested each of these beliefs, but they
tend to die very slowly. Most recently, the image of sexual harassment as a
private, non-job-related injury has reemerged in a more subtle, updated
fashion in the new elaborate doctrine that specifically governs hostile-
environment harassment claims. The end result is that sexual harassment is
rapidly becoming a disfavored cause of action, encumbered by special
requirements and onerous burdens of proof. For example, to establish a
claim for hostile environment harassment, plaintiffs must show a pattern of
severe or pervasive harassment that alters the victim's working
environment; mere isolated incidents that cannot be said to poison the
environment will not suffice. Some courts have interpreted this threshold
requirement in a categorical fashion to allow employers a "safe harbor" for
harassment that does not appear egregious to the court. 191 In the Seventh
Circuit in particular, prompted by an influential opinion by Judge Richard
189. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 818 (1991); B. Glenn George,
The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993); Johnson, supra
note 170, at 93-95.
190. For an analysis of these early cases, see Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,698-701 (1997).
191. For discussions of the safe harbor doctrine, see Anderson, supra note 10, at 125, 145-50;
Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don't Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litigation in the Lower
Courts, 1999 U. CH. LEGAL FOUND. 277, 286-94.
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Posner, 192 the safe harbor doctrine has meant that employees will lose their
case-as a matter of law-unless they can point to numerous incidents of
sexual touchings, threats, or sexual propositions that qualify as something
more than "low level harassment" that has been given immunity under this
pro-employer interpretation of the law. It is noteworthy that the courts
have not seen fit to allow employers a safe harbor for other forms of
discriminatory behavior, at least not as a matter of formal legal doctrine. A
decrease in pay, no matter how small, for example, is actionable disparate
treatment if traceable to an employee's sex or race. A discriminatory
denial of promotion constitutes a Title VII violation, even if the position
desired does not carry a significantly higher salary. For sexual harassment
cases, however, courts are often not satisfied with a demonstration of
disparity in treatment between the sexes and, in addition, insist on further
proof of serious harm and the connection between the harm sustained and
the plaintiff's employment status.
Another prime example of the special, disfavored status of sexual
harassment claims is the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense itself, for it
is the only defense to vicarious liability permitted for supervisory behavior
under Title VII. 193 In grappling with the proper treatment of constructive
discharge claims, the courts are in effect being called on to decide whether
constructive discharge will remain a first-class claim treated like other
forms of disparate treatment or will be tainted by the second-class status of
sexual harassment claims.
It is revealing that prior to its association with the claim of sexual
harassment, the courts had little difficulty imposing vicarious liability for
constructive discharge. The shift that may now be taking place from strict
liability to negligence has occurred only since the claim of constructive
discharge has become linked in people's mind to sexual harassment. In a
kind of guilt by association-specifically, cognitive association with sexual
192. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995). Later, Judge Posner
explained that Baskerville "created a safe harbor for employers in cases in which the alleged harassing
conduct is too tepid or intermittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person believe that she has been
discriminated against on the basis of her sex." Galloway v. Gen. Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78
F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996).
193. Because the Court uses the same standard for sexual and racial harassment claims, the
disfavored status of sexual harassment claims-the largest class of harassment claims-spills over to
affect racial harassment cases. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10
(2002) ("Hostile work environment claims based on racial harassment are reviewed under the same
standard as those based on sexual harassment."). See also L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex
in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 878-79 (1997) (discussing the potential for
racial harassment claims to be disadvantaged by the heightened proof requirement in sexual harassment
cases).
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harassment-more onerous requirements related to employer liability are
now being imposed as constructive discharge becomes assimilated to
hostile work environment claims.' 19 4 Simply put, constructive discharge is
becoming more difficult to prove now that the prototypical case involves
sexual harassment and the prototypical plaintiff is a woman.
The claim of constructive discharge has its origins in labor law. 195 In
cases starting in the late 1930s, union organizers and supporters were
intimidated and harassed by managers in an effort to pressure employees to
give up their support for unions and to retaliate against them for supporting
the union. 196  The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") first
employed the theory of constructive discharge to assure that employers
could not accomplish directly what they could not do indirectly, namely,
fire an employee for supporting the union. 197 The federal courts embraced
the new cause of action for constructive discharge and imposed vicarious
liability on employers, without questioning its applicability or expressing
concern that managers and supervisors who pressured union-affiliated
employees to quit might not be following company policy. Significantly,
when the prototypical victim of a constructive discharge was a union
supporter, the employer was not given the opportunity to prove that it had
acted reasonably or that the supervisor acted against its wishes.
One early leading case is NLRB v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, in
which the president of the company instructed a manager to find out
whether four truck drivers had become union members, but cautioned the
manager not to criticize them if they had. 198 The manager instead "went
entirely beyond the instructions," and when the drivers admitted that they
had joined the union, the manager told them he had lost confidence in them
and advised them to resign. The NLRB determined that the employees had
been forced to resign.199 In affirming the Labor Board, the Fifth Circuit
brushed aside the employer's contention that it should not be held
responsible for the acts of the manager. The court stated that even though
194. See infra text accompanying notes 204-14.
195. For a discussion of the evolution of constructive discharge law under the National Labor
Relations Act, see Shuck, supra note 49.
196. The first NLRB case to use the term "constructive discharge" was fi re Sterling Corset Co.,
9 N.L.R.B. 858 (1938). See Shuck, supra note 49, at 406.
197. NLRB v. Holly Bra of Cal., Inc., 405 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1969) ("An employer cannot do
constructively what the act prohibits his doing directly .... ").
198. NLRB v. E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, 140 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 1944).
199. Id. at 404. Because the plaintiffs made no claim for reinstatement or backpay, however, the
classic remedies for constructive discharge were not before the court. Id. The first federal appellate
court case to allow a backpay award in a constructive discharge case was NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe
Corp., 201 F.2d 238, 244 (1 st Cir. 1953), which is discussed in Shuck, supra note 49, at 408.
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the manager "went beyond and contrary to the orders of its president, this
cannot absolve it from the rigors of this Act. He was the representative of
Motors Lines, and while acting directly within the line and scope of his
employment clearly violated the inhibitions of the National Labor Relations
Act."200
Subsequent labor cases simply assumed that vicarious liability would
follow a finding of constructive discharge in those instances in which a
supervisor's actions compelled an employee to quit.20 1 One pattern that
emerged in these labor cases typically involved a supervisor who
interrogated union organizers around the time of an upcoming election. 2
Such interrogations had the effect of intimidating the targeted employees,
often because they were accompanied by explicit or implicit threats of
retaliation or a promise of benefits if the employees agreed to give up their
support of the union. The key issue in these cases was not whether top
management had ratified the supervisors' actions, for the simple reason that
ratification was not necessary to implement remedies for constructive
discharge; instead, the focus was solely on whether the supervisor's
conduct interfered with the employees' right to support the union.
Vicarious liability was assumed. 3
When constructive discharge law was imported into Title VII in the
1970s, the automatic imposition of vicarious liability continued to be part
and parcel of the doctrine. One early case, for example, dealt with an
employee's claim of religious discrimination. 204 The employee objected to
being required to attend monthly staff meetings that began with a short
religious talk and a prayer delivered by a Baptist minister. When she
disclosed her objections to her supervisor, he told her simply to "close her
ears" 20 5 and led her to believe that she would not be granted an exemption
from attending the religious portion of the meeting. She then decided to
quit without seeking further review of her supervisor's decision. The Fifth
200. E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, 140 F.2d at 405 (internal citation omitted).
201. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Cavalier Olds,
Inc., 421 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1970); Retail Store Employees Union Local 880 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 329
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Holly Bra of Cal., 405 F.2d at 870; NLRB v. Vacuum Platers, Inc., 374 F.2d 866 (7th
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Tenn. Packers, Inc., 339 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1964); Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp.,
201 F.2d at 238.
202. See, e.g., Retail Store Employees Union Local 880, 419 F.2d at 329; Tenn. Packers, 339 F.2d
at 203; Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d at 238.
203. Recent labor cases employ the same approach. See, e.g., L.S.F. Transp. Inc. v. NLRB, 282
F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2002); NLRB v. Grand Canyon Mining Co., 116 F.3d 1039 (4th Cir. 1997); NLRB v.
Bestway Trucking, Inc., 22 F.3d 177 (7th Cir. 1994).
204. See Young v. S.W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
205. Id. at 142.
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Circuit found a constructive discharge even though it also concluded that
the company had an unpublicized policy of granting exceptions to the
mandatory attendance rule, and that the plaintiffs supervisor probably did
not have the authority to fire her because she refused to attend. The court
reasoned that as long as the supervisor had the apparent authority to
interpret company policy, "it would be too nice a distinction to say that
Mrs. Young should have borne the considerable emotional discomfort of
waiting to be fired instead of immediately terminating her association with
Southwestern."2 6  Similarly, in a race discrimination case,20 7 the Fifth
Circuit imposed vicarious liability for constructive discharge when an
employee was harassed by a supervisor and denied equal pay, even though
the employee had been urged by a personnel director to complain to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rather than resign. Decisions
such as these underscore that before the advent of the sexual harassment
claim, courts regarded a finding of constructive discharge as carrying with
it the consequences of an actual discharge, including the imposition of
vicarious employer liability.
It should be noted that the turning point with respect to vicarious
liability did not come with the arrival of sex discrimination/constructive
discharge cases. To the contrary, some female plaintiffs in the early 1980s
were successful in proving constructive discharge and having vicarious
liability imposed in sex discrimination cases under Title VII. These cases,
however, tended to involve claims of gender-based discrimination other
than (or in addition to) sexual harassment and were litigated well before the
courts developed distinctive elements of proof to govern sexual harassment
claims. Thus, in a 1982 decision in the Ninth Circuit, 20 8 a woman
employee established constructive discharge by showing that, when she got
married, she was stereotyped as "geographically immobile" and denied
entry into a special program. Similarly, a saleswoman proved a
constructive discharge by coming forward with evidence showing that upon
returning from a six day medical leave following a miscarriage, she
discovered that her territory had been given to a new salesman.209
Given these precedents, it is not surprising that in the landmark sexual
harassment case, Henson v. Dundee,210 decided by the Eleventh Circuit in
1982, the court simply assumed that constructive discharge would entail
206. Id. at 144.
207. Calcote v. Tex. Educ. Found., Inc., 578 F.2d 95, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1978).
208. Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1982).
209. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).
210. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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vicarious liability and viewed the claim as one alleging a "tangible job
detriment," distinguishable from the ordinary hostile environment case.
211
Henson is well known to Title VII lawyers as the case that recognized the
hostile environment claim and held that a plaintiff need not prove a
tangible job detriment in every sexual harassment case. The U.S. Supreme
Court cited Henson favorably four years later when it decided Meritor
Savings Bank212 and authorized hostile environment claims. What is
significant for our purposes, however, is the aspect of Henson specifically
relating to constructive discharge. Although Henson was never able to
convince the courts that she had been constructively discharged, the
appellate opinion made it clear that constructive discharge, like claims for
quid pro quo harassment, was appropriately decided under a disparate
treatment framework that carried strict liability. 213  After Henson, the
conventional wisdom was that strict liability governed quid pro quo cases,
while negligence liability governed hostile environment cases. Few took
notice, however, that constructive discharge fell on the quid pro quo side of
the divide as a case involving a tangible job detriment.
The current dilemma about how to categorize constructive discharge
claims and the consequent reluctance of courts to impose vicarious liability
is thus a relatively new problem traceable to the cognitive association of
constructive discharge with sexual harassment claims. Prior to the
development of the hostile environment claim, the courts did not seem
concerned that employers might be held responsible for the actions of a
wayward supervisor who forced an employee to resign as part of an anti-
union or otherwise discriminatory course of action, even when the
company professed not to have endorsed such conduct. Particularly in the
labor cases, the courts seemed simply to equate supervisor action with
employer action, possibly because the judges assumed that employers
invariably wished to defeat the union and that there was no real conflict
between the supervisor's action and company policy.214 However, when
constructive discharge was imported into Title VII and employers began to
be held vicariously liable for sex and race discrimination, it was no longer
reasonable to assume that supervisors were acting in accord with the
211. Id. at 906-07.
212. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
213. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 n.1 1, 909-10.
214. Even if this assumption were accurate in most cases, certainly some employers did not intend
for their supervisors to violate the law in attempting to defeat the union and thus may not have endorsed
the illegal course of action, even if they hoped that the union campaign would be unsuccessful. Even in
the union context, therefore, it cannot be said that supervisors who constructively discharged union
activists were always acting in the company's interest or with the approval of management.
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company's wishes or policies. Instead, in most cases, employers insisted
that the discriminatory acts of supervisors violated company policy. In
these Title VII constructive-discharge cases, as in actual discharge cases, it
is fair to suppose that vicarious liability was imposed because the
supervisor had inflicted economic harm on the employee and had been
empowered to do so because of his position in the organization. It is only
when the harm inflicted no longer appeared to be economic and job-related
that qualms about imposing vicarious liability arose.
Now that the contested terrain is the constructive discharge/sexual
harassment case, the legitimacy of imposing vicarious liability on
employers has been called into question. Beneath the doctrinal debate
surrounding the proper classification of the constructive discharge claim
lies a more basic question related to fairness. Although the courts rarely
get down to this basic level, it is useful to ask, for example, why an
employer should be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory actions of
a supervisor who fires an employee against company policy, but not
vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisor who sexually harasses,
intimidates, and humiliates an employee so that she feels compelled to quit
her job.
I suspect that some would see the two cases quite differently and
would respond that, in the firing case, the discrimination is job-related and
tangible, while in the harassment situation, the supervisor's behavior is
personal and the injury is psychological and intangible. What is most
striking about this intuitive characterization of the two cases is that it tracks
old-fashioned attitudes about sexual harassment and resembles the early
reluctance of courts to recognize sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination under Title VII. 215 With the issue so exposed and no longer
hidden under layers of Title VII doctrine, it becomes necessary to restate
the case for treating sexual harassment as a job-related harm that should not
be viewed as private or intimate behavior. Additionally, it is useful to
uncover the reasons why harassment that leads to unemployment might be
recast as psychological, intangible harm and discuss why such
characterization is potentially unfair to plaintiffs.
Much of the campaign to make sexual harassment unlawful has
centered on de-privatizing the harm and linking it to other forms of job-
related discrimination, such as unequal pay or refusals to promote. Until
the mid-1970s, there was no word to describe sexual harassment. It was
not in our vocabulary because it had not yet been named as a discrete injury
215. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
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connected to employment.216 Employees, of course, had long experienced
sexual harassment. When they did, however, it was regarded as a personal
problem and a private matter. The most common response of sexual
harassment victims was to suffer-in silence or quit their job to try to escape
the harassment. The disruption of careers, the loss of seniority, and the
depression of ambition were some of the invisible consequences of
harassment.
As a result of a grassroots movement beginning in the nid-1970s, a
new consciousness developed about the way sexual harassment functioned
in the workplace, and there was a reassessment of the causes of sexual
harassment. Employees, legal advocates, and social activists began to
document that sexual harassment had much the same effect as other forms
of gender discrimination against women in the workplace-namely, to
retard women's advancement on the job and to reinforce gender
segregation. They argued that women were understandably reluctant to
integrate into all-male jobs because they feared that they would face
reprisals in the form of harassment for doing so.217 Additionally, victims
explained how costly it was to quit a job because of harassment,
particularly when there was no guarantee of receiving unemployment
compensation 2 18 or convincing a prospective employer that you had quit
your prior job for a good reason. By the early 1980s, it was clear that
sexual harassment was not just a personal problem faced by individual
women, but a systemic harm that a high percentage of women would
confront over the course of their working lives. A much-cited federal
survey of federal workers done in 1981, for example, found that forty-two
percent of female employees had experienced some form of harassment
during the previous two-year period.219
By the mid-1980s, there was a paradigm shift in our cultural and legal
approach to sexual harassment. Catharine MacKinnon has recently
216. For discussions of the origin of the term "sexual harassment" and its historical foundation,
see Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 38-43 (1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the
Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 818-26 (2002).
217. See Brigid O'Farrell & Sharon L. Harlan, Craftworkers and Clerks: The Effect of Male Co-
Worker Hostility on Women's Satisfaction with Non-Traditional Jobs, 29 Soc. PROBS. 252, 259 (1982).
218. See Diana M. Pearce & Monica Phillips, When Sexual Harassment Happens: State
Unemployment Insurance Coverage of Workers Who Leave Their Jobs Because of Sexual Harassment,
5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 76 (1994).
219. See UNITED STATES MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF FEDERAL WORKERS:
IS IT A PROBLEM? 33 (1981). A 1988 update of the survey found the same figure: forty-two percent of
women reported that they had been harassed. See UNITED STATES MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11 (1988).
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described the change that took place in sexual harassment law as a
"transformation from private joke to public weapon." 220 By uncovering the
effects of sexual harassment over the course of women's working lives, a
convincing case was made for treating sexual harassment as a civil rights
violation-as a form of gender discrimination that operated in the public
sphere of the workplace. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson in 1986, a unanimous Court simply declared that
sexual harassment violated Title VII. 221  Importantly, the Court did not
suggest that because the supervisor's actions in Meritor Savings Bank took
the form of sexual propositioning and sexual coercion, his actions should
be viewed as private, inspired by sexual attraction to the particular plaintiff
and therefore unrelated to the business of the defendant. Instead, by
recognizing the claim for hostile work environment, the Court focused on
the effects of the harasser's action on the plaintiff and her co-workers and
located the injury squarely in the realm of the workplace. 222
Supporting the judicial recognition of the claim, the academic
literature has supplied an account of the nature and causes of sexual
harassment that provides solid justification for de-privatizing the harm.223
Although commentators offer varying views of the contours of the injury
occasioned by sexual harassment,224 a common theme throughout the
220. See MacKinnon, supra note 216, at 831.
221. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). The Court categorically stated that
"[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Id.
222. Id. at 69-70. As commentators have noted, the Supreme Court has not provided an account
of why sexual harassment is actionable, focusing instead on describing what constitutes sexual
harassment. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 190, at 692. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998), the Court did, however, discuss Title VII's based-on-sex requirement in the context
of a same-sex sexual harassment case. In an oft-cited passage, the Court indicated that "harassing
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of
sex." Id. at 80. It went on to give two examples of actionable sexual harassment presumably not
prompted by the harasser's sexual desire. The first example involved harassment "motivated by general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Id. The second involved "direct comparative
evidence" of how the harasser treated both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace, presumably to show
disparate treatment in a same-sex harassment case. Id. at 81. Oncale neither rejected nor endorsed
feminist accounts of harassment as a means of perpetuating gender segregation in the workplace and
retarding women's advancement into more desirable lines of work.
223. Most commentators do not believe that sexual harassment is produced by a single cause, but
regard it as a multifaceted phenomenon with multiple causes. See Kathryn Abrams, The New
Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998).
224. Compare Franke, supra note 190, at 725-29, with Abrams, supra note 223, at 1193-1205.
Franke's gender norm approach emphasizes the role of harassment in policing gender roles and
promoting gender conformity, while Abrams places more emphasis on harassment's effect on women's
status in the workplace. See also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
252-55 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing various feminist explanations of the harm of sexual harassment).
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literature is that sexual harassment is not principally about sexual attraction
or sexual desire. In the view of scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon225
and, more recently, Vicki Schultz 226 and Kathryn Abrams, 227 sexual
harassment is not simply the byproduct of a particularized sexual desire,
but often stems from abuse of power, including that of supervisors who are
able to misuse their position to reinforce their authority over subordinates
in the workplace. Early on, MacKinnon argued that tort law was
inadequate to handle the problem of sexual harassment because it did not
focus on the social dimensions of the problem that went beyond
disrespectful or uncivil treatment of a woman by a particular supervisor or
co-worker. 228 Schultz has taken the position that harassment functions to
perpetuate gender segregation in the workplace and to reserve the most
highly rewarded lines of work for men.229 Likewise, Abrams argues that
sexual harassment sometimes functions to preserve male control over the
workplace, particularly in newly integrated fields where male control has
been called into question. 230  Studies demonstrate that the incidence of
sexual harassment is greater in male-dominated workplaces 231 and that the
most virulent forms of sexual harassment often occur in such settings. 232 In
such settings, male workers often harass their female co-workers not
principally because they want to have sex with them, but to intimidate the
women and make them feel like intruders. Schultz has argued that sexual
harassment functions principally. to question and to undermine the
competency of women to engage in certain kinds of work.233
Feminist accounts such as these that downplay the role of individual
sexual desire and sexual attraction and link sexual harassment to the
maintenance of gender hierarchies in the workplace reinforce the decision
to treat sexual harassment as a Title VII violation on a par with other forms
225. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION 172-73 (1979).
226. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1686-87.
227. See Abrams, supra note 223, at 1206-09.
228. See MACKINNON, supra note 225, at 164-74. MacKinnon argued that the highly
individualistic character of tort law makes it ill-suited to address the social harm of sexual harassment,
claiming that "[t]he essential purpose of tort law.., is to compensate individuals one at a time for
mischief which befalls them as a consequence of the one-time ineptitude or nastiness of other
individuals." Id. at 172.
229. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1756-61.
230. See Abrams, supra note 223, at 1206-07.
231. See Murrell et al., supra note 14 (noting that women working in a male-dominated setting
experience higher levels of unwelcome sexual overtures than women working in a more gender-
integrated workplace).
232. See Schultz, supra note 9, at 1750, 1832-39.
233. Id. at 1762-69.
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of disparate treatment. Once we connect sexual harassment, gender
segregation, and the lack of advancement of women in the workplace,
holding employers strictly liable for harassment by supervisors seems less
controversial and not so different from imposing liability for other work-
related harms inflicted by supervisors. Additionally, when Congress in
1991 expanded remedies for Title VII violations to include compensatory
and punitive damages and the right to a jury trial,234 one of its chief
objectives was to provide fuller relief for harassment victims, 235 thus
affirming the view of sexual harassment as a serious form of employment
discrimination that warrants federal intervention.
The de-privatization of sexual harassment, however, has been an
uneven and contested process. There continues to be a vein of scholarship
that insists that sexualized behavior is unique and should not be treated as a
form of sex discrimination. 236 More common, however, is an attitude that
regards sexual harassment skeptically, without going so far as to suggest
that it cannot constitute sex discrimination. As discussed earlier, 237 this
skepticism has manifested itself in the creation of judicial doctrines that
impose more stringent requirements on sexual harassment victims than
other discrimination claimants and has resulted in the disfavored status of
the claim. In many opinions, courts require plaintiffs to prove with
specificity and concreteness exactly how sexual harassment negatively
affected their job status, and they are reluctant to impose liability unless
they are convinced that upper management knew of the harassment and
consciously decided not to act to correct it. 238 Absent such proof, these
courts seem to resort to a default position, namely, that sexual harassment,
even when carried out by a supervisor against a subordinate, is essentially a
private matter that need not concern employers.
Thus, the hesitancy to impose vicarious liability in constructive
discharge cases may reflect the larger skepticism toward sexual harassment
claims and the hard-to-shake belief of some courts that sexual harassment
is private behavior. Moreover, the cognitive link that has been forged
between constructive discharge and sexual harassment also likely affects
the way in which some courts categorize the nature of the harm. As
234. See42U.S.C.§ 1981a(1994).
235. See Beiner, supra note 187, at 334-38 (discussing the statute's legislative history).
236. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8
YALE L. & POL'y REV. 333, 349-50 (1990).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 189-94.
238. See, e.g., DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2000); Black v. Zaring
Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826-27 (6th Cir. 1997); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432
(7th Cir. 1995).
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mentioned earlier, 239 as a practical matter, it is impossible to separate the
psychological from the economic effects of constructive discharge. By
definition, when an employee is constructively discharged, it is the
psychological impact of the supervisor's actions that compels the employee
to quit and to suffer the economic loss of unemployment. Because the
harm inflicted clearly includes economic harm, it is odd to view
constructive discharge as an intangible injury (i.e., not a tangible
employment action) and to treat these cases as if the employee had stayed
on the job and continued to receive a paycheck.
The tendency of some courts to erase the economic harm and to
approach the case as if it involves only psychological harm fits with a more
general phenomenon that pairs the nature of the injury to the image of the
prototypical plaintiff. There is a tendency-apparent most readily in the
law of torts-to categorize injuries cognitively linked to women as
intangible and psychological, while injuries associated with men are more
likely to be regarded as tangible, material, and economic. 24 Particularly in
cases in which the injury defies easy categorization, we may decide how to
categorize a loss by looking at who suffers the loss, rather than simply at
the objective effects of the activity or conduct. Consistent with prevailing
stereotypes related to femininity and masculinity, this perceptual process
categorizes injury sustained by women as psychological and noneconomic,
even though the same injury could, as a matter of logic, be characterized as
material and economic. The categorization, moreover, has significance in
the law since economic injuries are often more fully protected than
noneconomic losses. Thus, claims cognitively associated with women have
a lower value than claims associated with men and their injuries. Although
the devaluation persists whether the individual plaintiff is a man or a
woman, overall it has a negative effect on women as a group since they are
more likely to assert claims cognitively associated with women. 241 This
hierarchy of claims privileging economic over noneconomic claims thus
serves to limit recovery for female plaintiffs and constitutes a subtle but
injurious form of gender bias.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
240. For more in-depth development of this thesis, see generally CHAMALLAS, supra note 224, at
199-206; Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 463, 491-530 (1998); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816-19 (1990).
241. For more extensive discussion of the general features and dynamics of devaluation, see
Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 772-77 (2001).
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Now that constructive discharge is linked to sexual harassment, courts
may be more inclined to regard constructive discharge as a claim for
intangible or psychological loss because the prototypical victim is a
woman. Support for this hypothesis can be found in the history of the
claim: When the prototypical victim was a union organizer (most often
imagined to be a man), the courts readily imposed vicarious liability and
treated constructive discharge as a tangible injury;242 when the claim
shifted and the prototypical victim became a woman, the courts balked at
imposing vicarious liability and were more likely to recast the injury as
psychological in nature.
In the final analysis, the choice of strict liability versus negligence in
constructive discharge cases may have less to do with the nature of the
claim than with more general attitudes toward sexual harassment and
injuries linked to women. The danger is that courts will approach the
categorization of constructive discharge claims formalistically without an
appreciation of the history of the claim and the potential for gender bias in
the categorization process. When constructive discharge is treated as a
separate cause of action, there is a tendency simply to place the claim in
one of two boxes-disparate treatment or harassment-and to try to match
the liability rules to the frameworks already established (i.e., negligence for
harassment and vicarious liability for disparate treatment). To avoid this
difficult choice, it is possible to reorient the debate away from constructive
discharge as a separate cause of action requiring proper classification. The
final way to approach the categorization dilemma involves treating
constructive discharge solely as a right to receive backpay and frontpay-
that is, as a matter of remedial rather than substantive law.
E. SUBSTANTiVE LAW/REMEDY
part of the complexity associated with constructive discharge stems
from treating it as a separate cause of action when it could just as readily be
viewed as designating a plaintiff's right to receive backpay after proving
that her unemployment was caused by discriminatory action on the part of
her employer. Viewed solely as a remedy, constructive discharge can be
seen as flowing from either a hostile environment or a discrete
discriminatory action, such as a demotion or refusal to promote.
Additionally, when constructive discharge is viewed as a remedy, the
plaintiffs right to recover would seem principally to depend on proof of
causation. The critical question would be whether the hostile environment,
242. See supra text accompanying notes 195-99.
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demotion, or other discriminatory act caused the plaintiff to quit and suffer
the economic loss associated with unemployment.
What makes constructive discharge appear to be a separate cause of
action rather than a remedy, however, is the requirement that, as an initial
matter, the plaintiff must prove that her working conditions are
intolerable.243 By specifying this requisite threshold of proof before the
plaintiff is entitled to relief, the rules governing constructive discharge look
more like the elements of a distinctive claim, rather than simply a label for
economic loss stemming from unemployment. Indeed, before recognition
of the hostile environment claim and the 1991 Act's addition of
compensatory and punitive damages, 244 the intolerability requirement
functioned as an absolute limitation on monetary recovery for plaintiffs
who quit in response to a hostile environment. Now that a plaintiff may
recover monetary damages for psychological losses traceable to a hostile
environment, however, thehybrid quality of constructive discharge as part
remedy/part cause of action is more apparent.
To get at this aspect of the classification dilemma surrounding
constructive discharge, it is necessary to take a closer look at the
intolerability requirement. On closer inspection, the intolerability
requirement turns out to be shorthand for the standard definition of
constructive discharge. Specifically, courts look to see whether the
supervisor has made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
person would have felt compelled to resign.245  As interpreted by the
courts, intolerability has two main components: (1) an objective showing of
aggravated discrimination or harassment, often described as more than a
mere violation of law, and (2) efforts on the part of the plaintiff to mitigate
harm by giving the employer an opportunity to correct the situation.246 The
reasonableness inquiry embedded in the two prongs of the intolerability
requirement thus focuses simultaneously on the quality of the defendant's
behavior and on an assessment about whether the plaintiff's response was
justified under the circumstances. Some critics have argued, moreover, that
in practice, the spotlight tends to be on evaluating the plaintiff's response,
eclipsing the pivotal causal role played by the discriminatory conduct of the
243. For a discussion of the intolerability requirement, see supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 67-7 1.
245. The specific formulations of the intolerability requirement vary. Some courts describe the
standard as requiring proof that "working conditions are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable
person in the employee's shoes would resign." Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88
(3d Cir. 1984).
246. See Shuck, supra note 49, at 416-30.
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employer. 247  Calls for eliminating or modifying the intolerability
requirement thus tend to converge with the view that constructive discharge
should be treated as a remedy, rather than an independent cause of action,
and that recovery should be allowed once the plaintiff proves that the
employer's unlawful action caused her to resign.
For our purposes, what is striking about the intolerability requirement
is how closely it maps the requirements for recovery under the hostile
environment framework. Under each framework, the plaintiff has both a
heightened proof requirement-severe or pervasive for hostile environment
and intolerable for constructive discharge-and a special mitigation duty.
Notably, however, there are important differences in detail. As discussed
earlier,24 8 the courts have interpreted the threshold requirement of proof in
hostile environment cases as less demanding than in constructive discharge
cases, and the notice requirement built into the intolerability requirement is
less structured than that specified in the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense. 249 Finally, under the intolerability requirement, the plaintiff bears
the burden of showing that she explored alternatives before quitting, while
under Ellerth/Faragher, it is the employer who must prove each prong of
the affirmative defense, including the plaintiffs unreasonable failure to
mitigate the harm by reporting.250
The problems of coordinating the requirements for proving
intolerability under the law of constructive discharge with the new hostile
environment framework suggest that it may be time to reconsider the
wisdom of retaining the intolerability requirement in the context of Title
VII. The debate over whether constructive discharge should be treated as
an independent cause of action or as a remedy is thus intertwined with the
question of whether courts should continue to require plaintiffs to prove
more than an employer's violation of the law before they are allowed to
quit their job in response.
The fate of the intolerability requirement should ultimately rest on the
strength of the policy reasons behind its adoption in the first place. As
247. See Lieb, supra note 49, at 176 (arguing that the focus of inquiry should be on "the conduct
of the employer and not the response of the employee"). See also Shuck, supra note 49, at 443.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
249. Under EllerthlFaragher, the inquiry is narrowed to whether "the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
The notice requirement embedded in the intolerability requirement is more generally addressed to the
question of whether, under the circumstances, working conditions are so oppressive that there is
effectively no recourse within the organization. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
250. See supra discussion accompanying notes 84-85.
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elaborated in the early Title VII cases, the principal function of the
intolerability requirement was to encourage plaintiffs to mitigate their
damages by staying on the job and complaining about the objectionable
conditions rather than quitting. In the landmark case of Bourque v. Powell
Electrical Manufacturing Co., discussed earlier, 251 the court explained the
rationale behind requiring the plaintiff to stay on the job, rejecting the
plaintiffs contention that only the "foolhardy" would seek legal redress
from their current employer:
She [plaintiff] contends, however, that to require employees suffering
illegal discrimination to seek legal redress while remaining in their jobs
would contravene the policies served by Title VII because then only
"foolhardy" victims would seek relief from discrimination. We disagree.
Title VII itself accords legal protection to employees who oppose
unlawful discrimination. Moreover, we believe that society and the
policies underlying Title VII will be best served if, whenever possible,
unlawful discrimination is attacked within the context of existing
employment relationships. 252
The Bourque court believed that it was reasonable to require the
plaintiff to stay on the job and complain because the anti-retaliation
provisions of Title VII served to protect the employee who lodged a
complaint or otherwise opposed discrimination. However, the anti-
retaliation protection afforded under Title VII may not be as potent as the
Bourque court suggested.253 Recently, the Supreme Court has held that
plaintiffs who complain about allegedly discriminatory incidents that could
not reasonably be regarded as rising to the level of a hostile environment
(i.e., harassment that is clearly not severe or pervasive) are not entitled to
protection against retaliation based on those complaints. 254 The Court also
expressly left open the question of whether there is protection against
retaliation for employees who reasonably and in good faith believe that
they are the victims of actionable discrimination when it is later determined
251. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
252. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal citation
omitted). This passage has been influential and cited by numerous courts. See, e.g., West v. Marion
Merrell Dow, Inc., 54 F.3d 493, 498 (8th Cir. 1995); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342-43
(10th Cir. 1986); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
253. In addition to the impact of Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269-71
(2001), a few circuits do not allow a plaintiff to sue for retaliation unless the employee proves that the
retaliation affects an "ultimate employment action." See Henry, supra note 171, at 553, 560 (discussing
the standard for proving retaliation in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits). In these jurisdictions, an
employee who is assigned more adverse job duties or receives a negative evaluation because she filed a
complaint receives no legal protection from retaliation. Id. at 554.
254. See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 269-71.
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that the employer is not in fact liable for discrimination. 255  Although
Breeden may ultimately prove not to be a significant precedent-it is a
short per curiam opinion in which the plaintiff alleged only a very weak
case of discrimination-it does suggest that employees must exercise some
caution before they complain about discrimination to their employer. In
addition to the very real possibility that the employer might nonetheless
decide to violate Title VII and retaliate against the complaining
employee,256 Breeden now allows employers in some cases to retaliate
without running afoul of the law. Thus, the confidence that the Bourque
court expressed that an employee had nothing to lose by complaining now
seems misplaced.
More importantly, it is questionable whether the imposition of
Bourque's duty to mitigate by staying on the job is consistent with Title
VII's statutory scheme. As mentioned earlier, 257 Title VII has a special
duty-to-mitigate provision that requires that any backpay award be reduced
by any amount that the plaintiff earned or with reasonable diligence could
have earned after she left her job.258  The statutory duty-to-mitigate
requirement is well designed to prevent employees from quitting their job
precipitously because they must make an effort to secure comparable
employment and will be denied recovery if they do not make a sufficient
effort. Coupled with the fact that plaintiffs do not know whether they will
ultimately prevail in litigation, the duty to mitigate makes quitting a risky
proposition.
Significantly, courts have imposed the burden of proving the amount
to be deducted under the statutory duty to mitigate on the employer. 259 The
policy behind the Act appears to be that, while plaintiffs must take steps to
limit their losses, it is the employer who should bear the risk that its illegal
conduct might cause economic losses. When in doubt, it is the employer
who has violated the Act who should shoulder the loss.
In contrast, Bourque holds that an employee must mitigate her loss by
staying on the job even when the employer has violated the Act. It further
places the burden on the employee via the intolerability requirement to
255. Id. at 270.
256. See infra text accompanying notes 279-81 (discussing the threat of retaliation against
employees who complain).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
258. 42U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994).
259. See Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 591 (5th Cir. 1998),
vacated on grant of reh'g en banc, 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999), reinstated in relevant part, 182 F.3d
333 (5th Cir. 1999); BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 615 (1992).
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prove that she gave the employer an opportunity to correct the
discriminatory conditions. Beyond simply declaring that society is better
served when discrimination is attacked within the context of existing
relationships, Bourque did not explore the question of whether it made
sense to require a victim of discrimination to stay and fight when it is likely
that the employment relationship has already been damaged to a significant
extent by the very discrimination experienced by the plaintiff. In this
respect, the Bourque rule is reminiscent of the now generally discredited
spousal immunity provisions that attempted to preserve the harmony of a
marriage by denying an abused or wronged spouse the right to sue the other
spouse in court.26° Critics of the immunity provisions pointed out that
there was often little harmony to preserve when the couple had reached a
point where suing seemed a viable option.261
It seems overly optimistic to assume that a complaint from within will
succeed in transforming an environment for the original victim. Often,
both the employee and the employer would prefer to sever the relationship,
and the best that can happen is that the environment will be reformed for
the next woman or member of a racial minority who thereby becomes the
beneficiary of the prior dispute. A plaintiff need not stay on the job to
secure this improvement for the next wave of workers, however. Indeed,
management may feel more inclined to institute changes when it can do so
without the reforms being traced to a prior complaint of discrimination by
an existing employee. Bourque's duty to mitigate, above and beyond the
statutory duty to mitigate, seems like overkill.
Whether proof of intolerability ought to be retained as a prerequisite to
recovery for constructive discharge thus largely turns on whether the law
should impose a duty on plaintiffs to stay on the job and attempt to mitigate
their harm by utilizing the employer's internal grievance procedures.
Significantly, this is basically the same policy question underlying the
debate over whether constructive discharge should be classified as a
tangible employment action, insofar as the debate turns on whether
employers should be allowed to escape liability by proving the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Ultimately, whether the employee's
duty to report ought to be extended to cover cases of constructive discharge
is the most critical policy question that the courts must confront when they
finally decide on a doctrinal approach.
260. For a discussion of the evolution of the spousal immunity doctrine, see DOBBS, supra note
142, § 279, at 751-53 (2000).
261. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Inmunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 445-48
(1989).
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IV. THE REPORTING REQUIREMENT
As the foregoing analysis suggests, the current debate over the proper
classification of constructive discharge masks an important difference of
opinion over the legal significance of a plaintiff's use, or failure to use, an
employer's internal grievance procedure. Crucial to deciding whether
constructive discharge/hostile environment cases should be treated like
other hostile environment cases is the policy question of whether
employers should be able to assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
in this type of case. Recently, the Ellerth/Faragher defense has been the
subject of criticism by commentators who have disagreed with the
prevailing interpretation of the defense by the lower courts.262 The thrust
of the criticism is that, although the burden of proof is technically on the
employer, many courts merely require the employer to have a written
antidiscrimination policy in place and have imposed "an implicit burden"
on the plaintiff to "disprove the second element of the affirmative
defense" 263 and establish that she acted reasonably in not utilizing the
internal grievance process. The case then turns on the reasonableness of
the plaintiffs response to harassment, with many courts faulting the
plaintiff for delaying in reporting, not reporting to the proper person, or
otherwise not precisely following the prescribed procedure. 264  Although
the Ellerth/Faragher defense would permit the factfinder simply to reduce
damages to reflect the plaintiff's failure to mitigate her injury,265 the courts
have generally treated it as a complete defense and have fully insulated
employers who prevail on this issue.
What is most notable about the contemporary doctrine reflected in the
lower court rulings interpreting Ellerth/Faragher is the high degree of
importance placed on reporting harassment to employers. Although it has
long been established that Title VII imposes no exhaustion-of-remedies
requirement on plaintiffs prior to filing suit, 266 many courts seem to start
from the proposition that it is only fair to require an employee to report
262. See, e.g., B. Glenn George, If You're Not Part of the Solution, You're Part of the Problem:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 134-35 (2001); Grossman,
supra note 89, at 708; Marks, supra note 90, at 1422-23.
263. See Beiner, supra note 187, at 280-81, 289.
264. See Beiner, supra note 15, at 126-31; Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The
Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 21
(2003) ("[C]ourts have strictly enforced the victim's duty to complain.").
265. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that the affirmative defense could be raised as a defense
"to liability or damages." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
266. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982).
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harassment and give the employer an opportunity to correct it. 267
Moreover, courts may expect employees to report harassment regardless of
whether the harasser is the highest person in authority at that
establishment 268 and regardless of whether the harassment is so pervasive
that it appears to be part of the everyday culture of that workplace.
269
In marked contrast to the expectations reflected in the legal doctrine,
the social science research on employees' responses to harassment has
consistently found that very few victims pursue complaints through official
grievance procedures. In the most recent survey of federal workers, for
example, only 12% of harassed workers reported their harassment.27 0  An
earlier study of federal workers yielded similar results, with only 11% of
workers reporting their harassment to a higher authority and only about
2.5% using formal complaint channels. 271 The figures are no higher in the
academic world: Despite surveys indicating that 20% to 30% of college
women experience sexual harassment, 272 academic institutions often
process only a handful of formal complaints each year. Perhaps most
telling is a recent study that showed that, even among employees who
ultimately sue their employer for liability for workplace harassment, nearly
half (42%) did not report the harassment and only 15% did so in a timely
277manner. 273 There is thus a considerable gulf between the legal expectations
of courts and the actual behavior of employees.274 It is noteworthy that it is
atypical for victims to file an internal complaint even when their complaint
is grievous enough to make them willing subsequently to embark on legal
action.
267. In some notable instances, however, when courts have admitted expert testimony on the
reasons behind victims' reluctance to report, they have excused the plaintiffs behavior and allowed
recovery. See Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where Is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for
Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REV. 357, 380-84 (1999).
268. See, e.g., Elmasry v. Veith, No. 98-696-JD, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 340, at *22 (D.N.H. Jan.
7, 2000) (unpublished opinion); Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1251-52
(M.D. Ala. 1999); Lintz v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1082-83 (D. Kan. 1999); Jones v.
USA Petroleum, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1384 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
269. See Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1999).
270. See UNITED STATES MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 30 (1994).
271. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 497,498 (1991).
272. Id. at 497-98; Louise Fitzgerald, Sandra L. Shullman, Nancy Bailey, Margaret Richards,
Janice Swecker, Yael Gold, Mimi Ormerod & Lauren Weitzman, The Incidence and Dimensions of
Sexual Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 155, 170 (1988).
273. Sherwyn et al., supra note 90, at 1280.
274. See Grossman, supra note 264, at 8.
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The question boils down to whether courts should regard behavior that
is typical as nonetheless unreasonable. Should courts continue to insist that
employees who do not file internal reports of harassment forfeit their right
to legal recovery? So structured, it is hard to avoid framing the key
question as, "Why don't victims complain?" The question bears an eerie
similarity to the question often asked of domestic victims-"Why didn't
she leave?" 27 5-because beneath the question lies the suspicion that, if the
abuse was real or really serious, surely the victim's response would have
been more assertive. In the harassment context, employers and courts may
be lulled into believing that because there are few internal complaints, there
are no systemic problems.
The empirical research that has been conducted on the issue of
reporting reveals two clusters of reasons to explain victims' reluctance to
report. The first cluster involves fear. The leading researchers cite
multiple aspects of fear: "fear of retaliation, of not being believed, of
hurting one's career, or of being shamed and humiliated. ' 276 Anita Hill, at
the center of perhaps the most famous sexual harassment controversy,
explained that she did not report Clarence Thomas's harassment because
she wanted to continue to be able to do the legal work she had been doing
and worried that challenging Thomas would hurt her career.27 7 The cases
are legion with employees who assert that they are afraid to come forward
because they believe that the harasser will find a way to make things worse
for them, and they doubt whether management will take their side against a
more powerful or influential opponent.278
When an employee fails to file a complaint, we can never know
whether complaining would have made things worse in the individual case.
Many studies indicate, however, that reporting harassment may indeed
provoke retaliation. One-third of employees who filed formal complaints
in the 1981 federal study said that they had experienced retaliation. In one
study of state employees, the figure was as high as sixty-two percent.279
275. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1,5-7 (1991).
276. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The
Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES
117, 122 (1995).
277. Clarence Thomas Confirmation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
**15-16 (1991) (testimony of Prof. Anita Hill), available at LEXIS Federal News Service [hereinafter
Clarence Thomas Confirmation].
278. See Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267-68 (4th Cir. 2001); Young
v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 921, 926-27 (N.D. Miss. 2000); Pollack v. Wetterau
Food Distribution Group, 11 S.W.3d 754, 761 (Mo. App. 1999).
279. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 276, at 122.
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That retaliation often accompanies harassment can also be inferred from
the fact that sexual harassment victims frequently add a charge of
retaliation to their complaint. Nor, as an intuitive matter, is it surprising
that retaliation would often follow from a complaint. It is no secret that
complaints generate bad feelings, negative responses, and defensive
reactions. The complainant is often the person viewed as the
troublemaker.28° Even when the offending supervisor does not directly
retaliate against the complaining employee, co-workers may decide to
show their support for the supervisor by shunning, ostracizing, or otherwise
punishing the employee. This scenario recurs so often that some courts
have simply declared as a matter of law that a campaign of ostracism by
co-workers does not amount to actionable retaliation.
281
The other cluster of reasons given for victims' failure to file formal
reports centers on the preference that many women employees have for
approaching problems through informal and nonconfrontational means
rather than formal procedures. Researchers theorize that because women
typically have less power than men in an organization, they are reluctant to
invoke the formal procedures that were put in place by others and are
predisposed to use informal means to resolve disputes. 282  Sexual
harassment victims often report that they merely wish to put an end to the
harassment and have little interest in punishing the harasser. 283  This
preference for peace over justice may mean that they are more inclined to
seek out solutions to the problem short of filing a formal report. For this
reason, many sexual harassment victims find grievance procedures alien
and use coping mechanisms, such as avoidance and appeasement. Victims
also tend to seek social support as a substitute for filing a formal
280. See Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of
Sexual Harassment Complaints, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69, 80 (2000) ("Although the university
attempts to encourage reporting by making an accessible user friendly policy. . the complainant is still
viewed as a threat to the institution.").
281. See Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 969 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that ostracism by
co-workers cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686,
692 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that disrespect and ostracism by a supervisor are insufficient adverse
actions to support a retaliation complaint); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243
(4th Cir. 1997) (finding no actionable claim where management told co-workers to spy on the plaintiff
and not to socialize with her).
282. See James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis
of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 814, 821 (1986)
(noting that persons with low power in the organization tend to respond passively to harassment);
Kihnley, supra note 280, at 86 (describing the formal complaint process as the "most intimidating"
process for employees to pursue); Riger, supra note 271, at 500-01.
283. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 276, at 122; Riger, supra note 271, at 500.
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complaint. 28 4  Like Anita Hill, sexual harassment victims may indeed
complain about their harassment to a friend285 or to a trusted colleague at
work,286 even though they do not go through proper channels to report the
incident.
Thus, the common sense requirement that victims should report
harassment and give the employer a chance to respond is very much at odds
with the social reality that workers, especially women workers, are
reluctant to lodge formal complaints. Despite the incentive provided by
legal reporting requirements, these patterns are unlikely to change because
the social science evidence on lack of reporting has been so consistent and
the pressures not to report are still present in the workplace. Thus, when a
court regards a victim's failure to report as presumptively unreasonable, it
is making a negative judgment that applies to a large majority of sexual
harassment victims.
In addition to the gulf between the expectation of reporting and the
actual practice of victims, it is also striking that courts place such a high
importance on the existence of formal procedures when employees and
social scientists recognize that informal structures and the informal culture
of an organization are often more significant. 287  The first prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense requires that employers demonstrate that they
have acted reasonably to prevent harassment. Although this "reasonable
care" requirement could be interpreted to require employers to take fairly
aggressive action to cut down on the incidence of harassment, a recent
review of the cases indicates that a large majority of courts hold that an
employer exercises reasonable care when it has a formal policy that is
disseminated to all employees and provides employees with an opportunity
to report the harassment to someone other than a harassing supervisor. 288
Many courts thus equate having a formal policy with reasonable care.
284. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 276, at 120.
285. See Clarence Thomas Confirmation, supra note 277.
286. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782-83 (1998) (noting that the
plaintiff complained to a supervisor she held in high esteem, but did not report harassment through the
designated channels).
287. Lauren Edelman, a leading organizational theorist, uses the term "formal structures" to refer
to "the configuration of offices and positions and the formal linkages between them (the 'organization
chart') as well as to formal rules, programs, positions, and procedures." Lauren B. Edelman, Legal
Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc.
1531, 1542 (1992). She contrasts these with "informal structures," defined as "actual communication
channels between offices and positions, the actual behavior of individuals who occupy them, and
informal norms and practices." Id.
288. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 90, at 1290. Notably, a 1999 study indicated that ninety-seven
percent of respondent employers had written policies against sexual harassment, thus easily meeting the
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In contrast, sociologists of law have long noted that there is a large
gap between the formal and the informal organization and that, in the
business world, rules are routinely violated.289 In other words, there is a
vast difference between having a formal policy against discrimination and
harassment and actual compliance with Title VII. For this reason,
interdisciplinary legal scholars have also begun to analyze the workplace as
a cultural institution and have focused on informal structures and
practices. 290
Organizational theorists often start from the premise that power in an
organization is not always visible. The rankings denominated in the formal
organizational chart may be far less important than the opinion of persons
who have real clout in the organization. Whether an organization
discourages or tolerates harassment may have more to do with the personal
style and commitments of top managers than the formal policies in the
employee handbook. Although it is often hard to express or describe, the
informal working culture of an organization is of paramount importance. 291
The fact that a manager who engages in harassment can easily enlist a
victim's co-workers to ostracize her for not acceding to his sexual advances
is thus likely to speak volumes about the organization's willingness to
tolerate and support harassment, despite its formal policies, and signals to
employees that resistance would be futile or very costly.
292
minimum requirements of EllerthlFaragher. See SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT SURVEY 6 (1999).
289. See Edelman, supra note 287, at 1542 ("[I]nformal practices and norms often deviate from
formal procedures and rules.") (internal citation omitted); John Meyer & Brian Rowan, Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 342-43 (1977).
290. Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written extensively in this vein. See Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 70 ORE. L. REV. 103 (2000); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL. L. REV. 1259 (2000). See also Martha
Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary
Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); Schultz, supra note 9; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003).
291. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1724 (2000). According to Lopez,
[T]he most decisive aspects of any particular organization lie not in its formal features, but
rather in the way they more generally reflect received templates. The general form adopted
by organizations engaged in particular tasks, the means that are regularly chosen and those
that are not, the expected goals, the accepted measures of success or failure-all of these
reflect unexamined understandings of what is organizationally appropriate.
Id.
292. See Pollack v. Wetterau Food Distribution Group, II S.W.3d 754, 761 (Mo. App. 1999).
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One other reason we should be hesitant to equate the existence of
internal grievance procedures with legal compliance is that internal
processes, although they may mimic judicial procedures, 293 are very
different from court proceedings. Internal grievance procedures and the
apparatus and personnel associated with them often serve functions other
than enforcement of legal requirements: They have symbolic importance as
visible markers of the company's compliance, but, at the same time, they
allow the employer to control the process and assure that compliance does
not interfere with the employer's other more pressing interests.294  The
decisionmaker is not neutral in the sense of not being accountable to either
side; rather, the person assigned to resolve the dispute is an employee of
the potential defendant who has an interest in minimizing the extent of the
conflict, saving the image of the employer, and maintaining smooth
relationships. 295 His or her main job is to insulate the employer from legal
liability, a goal that may not always coincide with cutting down on the
incidence of sexual harassment.296
Researchers who have studied internal grievance procedures have
noted the tendency of such processes to treat complaints in an
individualized manner and approach the cases as if they involved
personality clashes. 297 The confidentiality of the process often reinforces
this perception, given that there is rarely an opportunity publicly to discuss
whether the grievance is part of a larger pattern. 298  Finally, the
decisionmakers often have little knowledge of substantive Title VII law or
the policies underlying them and tend to equate fairness with procedural
regularity. As one researcher put it, the focus is on "good organizational
governance, deemphasizing the specific legal goals of racial and gender
293. See Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. Erlanger, The Endogeneity of
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999) (discussing
how courts legitimate organizational structures that mimic the legal form).
294. See Edelman, supra note 287, at 1531, 1535, 1541, 1567.
295. Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger & John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 497,506 (1993).
296. In fact, affirmative action officers who stress substantive compliance with Title VII law run
the risk of being terminated or having their power and autonomy curtailed. See Lauren Edelman,
Stephen Petterson, Elizabeth Chambliss & Howard S. Erlanger, Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of
Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers' Dilemma, 13 LAW & POL'Y 73, 84 (1991).
297. See Edelman et al., supra note 295, at 515 (stating that there is a tendency to recast legal
issues as interpersonal issues). See also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance:
Understanding Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 12-13
(1999).
298. See Kihnley, supra note 280, at 81 (discussing a university's concern with disseminating too
much information about discrimination complaints).
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equality." 299 In short, employers look for ways of resolving a particular
dispute rather than remedying a civil rights violation.
The irony of the current trend toward steering sexual harassment
victims to use internal grievance procedures is that we may subtly be
moving back to the approach of the 1970s when sexual harassment was
considered to be a personal problem for individual women, rather than a
systemic injury.300 The danger is that the privatization of enforcement of
Title VII laws, given a considerable boost by the adoption of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, may have the effect of discouraging
victims to come forward if they sense that their complaint will not be
treated as serious violations of the law and will reflect poorly on their
ability to manage personality conflicts. 30 1 As in the 1970s, moreover, the
most common response of victims may be to suffer in silence and to quit
when conditions get too bad.
These concerns about increasing formalism and the privatization of
Title VII enforcement counsel against simply grafting the Ellerth/Faragher
defense onto constructive discharge cases that arise from sexually harassing
environments. The gap between the vision courts have of the way victims
should respond to harassment and the actual behavior of harassed
employees suggests that the law is out of synch with social reality and
threatens to render Title VII ineffectual as a means to dismantle entrenched
gender hierarchies in the workplace. Before settling on an approach to
constructive discharge, courts should consider whether there are
countervailing principles and policies that militate in favor of imposing
strict liability in this important type of case, where plaintiffs have already
severed their connection to their employer and are seeking protection
against economic losses stemming from unemployment.
V. FOUR GUIDING PRINCIPLES
In addition to the considerations of doctrine and policy already
articulated by the lower courts, 30 2 1 would advocate that courts consider the
following four principles in their struggle to categorize constructive
discharge. I regard these as feminist principles, primarily because they
presuppose that harassment is widespread and are consciously designed to
299. Edelman et al., supra note 295, at 515.
300. See Chamallas, supra note 216, at 37.
301. See Edelman et al., supra note 293, at 449 ("[Wlhen courts adopt forms of compliance
created within organizational fields, they run the risk of institutionalizing the very forms of
discrimination that laws were originally designed to alleviate.").
302. See supra text accompanying notes 103-91.
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stimulate cultural changes in the workplace. They are derived from the
insights of organizational theory discussed above in connection with the
social science data on reporting 30 3 and informed by feminist theoretical
accounts of the nature and causes of sexual harassment. 3°4  At base,
however, they are simple statements of policy that could readily be
incorporated into current doctrine. The four principles are also fully
compatible with the twin objectives of Title VII (i.e., the deterrence of Title
VII violations and the compensation of victims of discrimination).3 °5
The first two principles relate to how courts conceive of business
organizations. They seek to reorient courts away from formalism in their
analysis of the employer's duty to prevent and correct harassment. The
first principle is that informal structures are as important as formal
structures. Courts should recognize that the informal culture of an
organization is as important as the formal policies in the employee
handbook and should make their assessments of whether employers and
employees act reasonably against this backdrop. This principle has
implications in both pure hostile environment cases and constructive
discharge/hostile environment cases. In the former, it would militate
against formalist interpretations of the Ellerth/Faragher defense that
insulate employers who have a formal grievance procedure in cases where
the culture of the organization inhibits employees from protesting
harassment and discrimination. 30 6 In the constructive discharge context, it
would counsel against insisting that employees utilize their employer's
internal grievance procedures before having the legal right to quit their job.
The second principle mirrors the first: The informal power of
supervisors is as important as formal power. Because of their position in
the organization, supervisors can exert their influence and affect the climate
of the workplace even when they do not exercise their formal powers to
fire, demote, or decrease an employee's compensation. The supervisor
who, for example, is able to enlist workers to ostracize or shun an
employee who complains of discrimination can have a substantial effect on
the daily life of the targeted employee and can shape the norms of the
workplace in a way that goes beyond his delegated powers.
30 7
303. See supra text accompanying notes 270-301.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 216-35.
305. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,417-21 (1975).
306. See, e.g., Joanna Grossman, Legal Commentary, What Should Happen When Sexual
Harassment Victims Don't File Prompt Complaints, FINDLAw, Apr. 8, 2003, at http://writ.
news.findlaw.com/grossman/20030408.html (arguing that courts should ask whether the employer has
created an environment that is affirmatively conducive to complaints).
307. See supra note 281 (discussing the ostracism cases).
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The second principle has special relevance for the constructive
discharge situation. It would militate in favor of treating constructive
discharge on a par with actual discharge. In line with the teachings of
organizational theory, the fact that the supervisor did not act formally and
took no official action would not be dispositive. Once a court concluded
that a constructive discharge took place, it would be inclined to regard it as
a tangible employment action because it had the same effect as a firing.
Recognizing the significance of the informal power of supervisors would
also support taking a flexible approach to determining whether working
conditions had become intolerable. The fact that a plaintiff did not make a
formal complaint would not necessarily defeat liability.
The above two principles can be seen as furthering the deterrence
objective of Title VII because of their potential to decrease the actual
incidence of sexual harassment. Social science research into the workings
of organizations indicates that informal structures and culture are a better
barometer of the actual behavior of individuals within an organization than
are formal policies and procedure. 30 8 While formal structures may confer
legitimacy on an organization and perform the symbolic function of
signaling compliance with the law, they often bear little relationship to
substantive results. If the law does not respond to the informal
organization, it is unlikely to induce significant changes in the status quo.
The third principle relates to how courts judge the actions of
employees who assert claims of discrimination. It principally relates to the
need to compensate victims of employment discrimination, although it may
also further the objective of deterrence insofar as legal liability creates an
incentive for employers to take steps to decrease harassment. The third
principle is that the typical response of employees should be regarded as
reasonable. The principle has two important corollaries for current
doctrine relating to claims of constructive discharge and hostile
environment harassment. The first corollary is that if most employees do
not report harassment, courts should not routinely regard an employee who
fails to report harassment as having acted unreasonably. The objective of
providing compensation for Title VII victims will not be accomplished if
the law provides relief only for extraordinary persons who resist against the
odds. Under this principle, compensation should be available to the
average person who is not used to confrontation and is unwilling to risk the
308. See THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 6-15 (Walter W. Powell &
Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
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humiliation and retaliation that frequently accompanies a challenge to
authority in the workplace. 309
The second corollary is that if the response of most employees is to
quit when faced with a hostile environment, courts should regard such a
response as reasonable and justified. This would require courts to
reconsider what is meant by intolerable working conditions when faced
with claims of constructive discharge. If most employees quit their job
when the harassment becomes severe or pervasive, it suggests that hostile
environments are often in fact intolerable. Courts could then discard the
calibrated distinction between severe or pervasive harassment and
intolerable working conditions and afford employees a right to quit when
they are faced with a sexually hostile environment.
Shaping Title VII doctrine to reflect the responses of the average
employee subjected to harassment has considerable advantages in the
context of constructive discharge.3" ° It assures that courts will not require
employees to act either imprudently or heroically and implicitly respects
the choices that most employees actually make. It also discourages courts
from making assumptions about how women should respond to sexual
harassment and concluding that victims who do not report could not have
suffered serious harm. Perhaps most importantly, regarding the typical
employee's response as reasonable implicitly incorporates the worker's
perspective into legal doctrine and supports the notion that most workers
want to keep their job and are not likely to quit for trivial reasons.
Particularly when the law requires employees to mitigate their damages by
309. See Grossman, supra note 306 ("Many women choose costly consequences-such as quitting
their jobs-to avoid dealing with harassment directly .... ").
310. Reliance on a "typicality" principle in the specific context of constructive discharge raises
fewer problems than it does in other contexts-for example, in selecting the appropriate perspective to
determine whether harassment is sufficiently harmful to warrant recovery. See Kathryn Abrams, The
Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law, DISSENT 50-51 (1995); Martha
Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial
Harassment Litigation, I TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 135 (1992). The debates over whether the severity of
harassment should be judged from a reasonable person, a reasonable woman, or a reasonable victim
standard can be avoided because, in the constructive discharge context, the question is narrowed to
whether inaction or the failure to report should be regarded as reasonable, and the empirical evidence
demonstrates that only a small minority of victims report their harassment through internal channels.
This is not a context in which differing perceptions of what is offensive or sexist come into play and in
which the gender of the target is likely to make a difference. Nevertheless, if the typicality principle
were used to predict whether the typical employee would quit when faced with a hostile environment,
the same debates over perspective would likely surface. For this reason, I propose a causation-based
model that gives victims the ight to quit if subjected to a hostile environment, without presenting proof
that the typical employee would do so or that a reasonable employee would so respond. See infra text
accompanying notes 346-47.
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finding comparable work once they leave their job,31' there is reason to
believe that the decision to quit will not be made lightly.
The body of social science research published in the last decade
clearly establishes that most victims of sexual harassment do not report
harassing incidents. 312 It thus provides a reliable guide-to the behavior of
the typical employee on that point. There is no comparable data disclosing
the typical response of employees who face a hostile environment.
Although it is clear that many employees. quit because of sexual
harassment, the studies are not refined enough to tell us whether this
response is typical.31 3 One difficulty is that to provide a reliable answer to
the question of whether most employees would quit in response to hostile
environments (defined as environments characterized by severe or
pervasive harassment), a study must separate the situation of employees
who have been exposed to any harassment from those who face severe or
pervasive harassment and thus are subjected to a hostile environment. In
the absence of more refined studies on the point, courts inclined to accept
the typicality principle may resort to intuitive judgments about the typical
employee based on their own assessment of the impact that hostile working
conditions would likely have on most workers.
The fourth and final principle that I would offer to guide courts in
their approach to constructive discharge relates to the categorization of
harm stemming from discrimination in the workplace. It is that economic
and psychological harm are interrelated and should both be recognized as
job-related injuries. In the workplace context, economic injury often leads
to, or is accompanied by, psychological distress, as in the case of a
discriminatory discharge in which an employee suffers mental distress as a
result of the circumstances surrounding the firing and the subsequent stress
of unemployment. The converse also holds true: Psychological stress in
the workplace context often leads to economic loss. Thus, employees who
suffer psychological distress as a result of a hostile working environment
may become less productive or have their interest in advancement
dampened, eventually producing economic loss.3 14 Such is the case with
constructive discharge when the psychological stress produced from
311. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 270-74.
313. See supra text accompanying note 14.
314. If the plaintiff can trace her decreased performance to sexual harassment, the employer may
not rely on such performance as a legitimate basis for discharge. See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F.
Supp. 1269, 1280 n.10 (D.D.C. 1988); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984);
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 259, at 197-98.
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working in a hostile environment induces a plaintiff to quit her job and
suffer the economic injury associated with unemployment.
Courts and commentators do not always recognize the
interrelationship between the two types of injuries, and they have a more
difficult time categorizing psychological harm as a job-related injury.315
There is a tendency to regard economic harm as the more important or
more legitimate type of job-related injury, as evidenced by the disfavored
status of hostile environment cases under Title VII. 316  There is also a
tendency to dichotomize the harms and to label an injury as either
economic or psychological, when it might be better characterized as a
blend or mixture of the two.317 Thus, some of the difficulty that the courts
have experienced in handling constructive discharge cases stems from a
futile attempt to pinpoint the nature of the harm as either
psychological/intangible or economic/tangible and then to treat it
accordingly. The blended nature of the harm of constructive discharge,
however, defies such categorization and requires the courts to resort to
policy to find a way out of the classification dilemma.
A danger associated with the judicial tendency to classify constructive
discharge as either an economic injury or a psychological harm (but not
both) is that in making their classification decision, the courts will simply
match the nature of the injury to the prototypical plaintiff. The history of
the constructive discharge claim indicates that the current cognitive
association of constructive discharge with sexual harassment cases and
women's injuries has led some courts to treat it as an intangible injury akin
to other hostile environment claims. 318 In the past, when the constructive
discharge claim was not so linked to sexual harassment, courts had no
difficulty viewing it as economic harm and imposing vicarious liability.
315. Catharine MacKinnon first identified this tendency when she argued that tort law, with its
emphasis on dignitary harm, did not capture the full dimensions of sexual harassment as an injury and
missed the job-related harm.
The [tort] approach tends to pose the necessity to decide whether sexual harassment is
essentially an injury to the person, to sexual integrity and feelings, with pendent damages to
the job, or whether it is essentially an injury to the job, with damages extending to the person.
Since it is both, either one omits the social dynamics that systematically place women in these
positions, that may coerce consent, that interpenetrate sexuality and employment to women's
detriment because they are women.
MACKINNON, supra note 225, at 17 1.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 189-94.
317. For a discussion of the judicial tendency to dichotomize in bias cases, see Chamallas, supra
note 241, at 782, 800.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 234-42.
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The fourth principle seeks to curb the tendency to create a hierarchy of
harms under Title VII by placing economic injury above psychological
harm. Because the statute authorizes recovery for both types of harm and
does not require courts to separate the two, the objective of compensating
discrimination victims can best be accomplished by treating each type of
injury equally. Recognizing the interdependency of the two harms is
practical and assures that harms cognitively associated with women will
not be subtly devalued or ruled out as non-job-related injuries.
The four principles discussed above do not by themselves dictate an
approach to constructive discharge. As the prior dissection of the
constructive discharge claim revealed,319 this corner of the law is fraught
with complexity, and courts are in fact free to devise a variety of
approaches with an even larger number of variations in detail. In the final
part, I list three models or approaches that the courts might consider in
creating a doctrinal framework to handle constructive discharge cases. The
last model, which I term the causation-based model, most closely tracks
and implements the four principles discussed above.
VI. THREE MODELS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Ellerth/Faragher, two major
models have emerged in the lower courts for treating constructive
discharge claims. 320 The first (the pro-defendant model) treats constructive
discharge like other hostile environment cases. 321 The second (the pro-
plaintiff model) regards constructive discharge as a tangible employment
action and treats it like other disparate treatment cases. 322
In my view, however, each model has its drawbacks. The pro-
defendant model does not adequately harmonize the Ellerth/Faragher
framework with the elements of the constructive discharge case. The pro-
plaintiff model fails to consider whether the intolerability requirement
should be revised now that most constructive discharge cases arise from
sexually hostile environments. For these reasons, I offer an additional
model for consideration that allows plaintiffs to recover upon proof that an
employer's discriminatory conduct caused her to resign. This causation-
based model would greatly simplify the law by eliminating the need to
319. See supra Part III.
320. See supra discussion accompanying notes 125-35. In addition to the two basic approaches,
some courts have yet to commit themselves and have taken a middle-ground position that treats some,
but not all, constructive discharges as tangible employment actions.
321. See supra Part II.C.1.
322. See supra Part II.C.2.
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prove intolerability and by allowing recovery of economic and
noneconomic damages on an equal basis. Most importantly, it has the
advantage of reflecting and tracking the actual behavior of employees and
offers the most promise for preventing and lowering the incidence of
harassment.
A. PRO-DEFENDANT MODEL
* Not a tangible employment action
* Allows affirmative defense
* Retains intolerability requirement
The model that up to very recently32 3 had the edge in the lower courts
is a pro-defendant model that declares that a constructive discharge is not a
tangible employment action because it is not traceable to an official act on
the part of the company. The model emerges from the line of cases
following Caridad,32 4 the influential 1999 Second Circuit decision. Under
this categorization, constructive discharge is assimilated to other hostile
environment cases: The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense may be
invoked and, for all practical purposes, negligence principles apply to
determine liability. In particular, a plaintiff who fails to report her
harassment through the internal process set up by the employer may find
that she has forfeited her right to recover.
So far, courts favoring the pro-defendant model seem content to retain
the traditional elements of the constructive discharge claim. Thus, to prove
constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that her working conditions
were intolerable and not simply severe or pervasive.325 Even though the
pro-defendant model adopts the hostile environment framework for
constructive discharge cases, it still requires that juries make the finely
calibrated distinction between severe or pervasive and intolerable levels of
harassment, a judgment that is highly subjective and not likely to yield
consistent results from case to case. Additionally, as part of this
intolerability showing, most courts also require the plaintiff to prove that
she afforded the employer an opportunity to correct the offending
conditions, a requirement that often translates into a duty to report
harassment to the employer through internal channels. 326
323. The edge that Caridad had in the lower courts may have stemmed largely from the fact that it
was the first appellate court to treat the issue.
324. See supra Part I.C. 1.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48, 245.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97, 246-47.
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As is the case with respect to all three models, there is the statutory
duty to mitigate damages under the pro-defendant model. After quitting,
the plaintiff has a duty to seek comparable employment. Any amount that
the plaintiff earned or with reasonable diligence could have earned will be
deducted from the backpay or frontpay award of the plaintiff who
successfully proves constructive discharge. 327
As described, the pro-defendant model leaves open important issues
and is hard to coordinate with the Ellerth/Faragher framework. The first
complexity deals with cases of constructive discharge that do not arise from
a hostile environment, but instead stem from a discrete discriminatory act,
such as a demotion. Traditionally, such cases have been decided under a
disparate treatment framework, imposing vicarious liability with no
affirmative defense. However, because even in a demotion case there is no
official action accompanying the constructive discharge itself,328 the pro-
defendant model would suggest that the hostile environment framework
should somehow control. Aside from introducing the affirmative defense,
however, it is not apparent how to fit cases of discrete discriminatory action
into a hostile environment framework.
The most difficult coordination problem associated with the pro-
defendant model relates to the nature of the reporting requirement and the
assignment of the burden of proof on this issue. The Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense is a specific two-pronged defense to guide the courts'
inquiry into notice.329 The burden of proof is on the employer. In contrast,
the implicit notice requirement read into the intolerability requirement is
open-ended and permits courts greater latitude in interpretation. 330  The
burden of proof is on the employee. Under the pro-defendant model, it is
not clear whether the Ellerth/Faragher framework would supplant the
notice requirement embedded in the intolerability requirement or if both
requirements would survive. If both survived, the factfinder could easily
become confused, particularly given that the burden of proof would then
depend on the precise cause of action. This would mean that the claim for
constructive discharge would have to be treated separately from the claim
for hostile environment. Not only would the former require proof of
intolerable conditions, rather than merely severe or pervasive harassment,
327. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
328. Of course, a court could decide that a demotion qualifies as an official action and treat the
whole case as one involving a tangible employment action. Sidestepping the issue in this way,
however, fails to address the fact that it was the plaintiff s unofficial action of quitting that immediately
led to her unemployment.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97, 246-47.
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but the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages prior to quitting would be
somewhat different for each claim. The complexity that the pro-defendant
model introduces into an already complex body of law should give courts
pause, even if they are inclined to shape the doctrine in a manner favorable
to employers.
B. PRO-PLAINTIFF MODEL
* Tangible employment action
* No affirmative defense
* Retains intolerability requirement
The pro-plaintiff model, recently endorsed by the Suders court,33'
starts from the proposition that a constructive discharge is a tangible
employment action. With its focus on the effects on the plaintiff rather
than on the unofficial nature of the action, the pro-plaintiff model treats
cases of constructive discharge the same as cases of actual discharge.
Under this categorization, constructive discharge is assimilated to other
disparate treatment cases: The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is not
available and vicarious liability is imposed.
It is easier to mesh the pro-plaintiff model with the framework of
Ellerth/Faragher for the simple reason that this model takes constructive
discharge cases out of the hostile environment framework. Thus, vicarious
liability is imposed in all cases of constructive discharge, whether arising
from discrete discriminatory actions or a hostile environment. There is also
no confusion with respect to burden of proof and the notice requirement.
Under the pro-plaintiff model, the defendant must establish the
Ellerth/Faragher defense in pure hostile environment cases, while the
plaintiff retains the burden of proving intolerability (with its implicit notice
requirement) in constructive discharge cases. 332
One deficiency I find in the pro-plaintiff model is that the courts
applying the model have failed to examine whether the intolerability
standard should be retained now that constructive discharge cases are more
likely to arise from sexually hostile environments than discrete
331. See supra Part II.C.2.
332. In constructive discharge cases, although the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, the notice
requirement is arguably more flexible than it is under the second prong of the EllerthlFaragher
affirmative defense. Courts have discretion to dispense with notice if they conclude that working
conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. Under
EllerthlFaragher, the court must focus more specifically on whether the plaintiff unreasonably failed to
report the harassment.
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discriminatory acts. Courts have not yet asked the important question of
whether it makes sense to maintain the elusive distinction between severe
or pervasive harassment, on the one hand, and intolerable conditions on the
other. Because this distinction was not present in the early cases when the
intolerability standard was first fashioned and imported into Title VII
law, 333 there has been no discussion in the cases of the core issue of
whether employees should have a right to quit their job when faced with a
sexually hostile environment. Because, by definition, a hostile
environment amounts to conduct that has altered the terms and conditions
of employment, 334 a rule that regarded the plaintiff s resignation as justified
whenever she encountered severe or pervasive discrimination-whether in
the form of harassment or a discrete discriminatory act-seems more
workable and fair than the current doctrine.
Additionally, retention of the intolerability requirement with its built-
in notice requirement does not alert courts to the possible inequity of
making a plaintiff's recovery turn on whether she invoked the employer's
internal grievance process. The problems commentators have noted in
relation to the reporting duty under the second prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense 335 may also be present in judicial
interpretations of the intolerability standard in the constructive discharge
context. A model, such as the causation-based model discussed below, that
is consciously designed to reflect the response of the typical employee and
is skeptical of an internal reporting requirement would give considerably
more protection for employees.
C. CAUSATION-BASED MODEL
* Tangible employment action
" No affirmative defense
" Eliminates intolerability requirement
The causation-based model permits plaintiffs to recover whenever
they prove that they quit their job in response to a hostile environment.
The model most closely resembles the pro-plaintiff model, but also
expressly responds to the four guiding principles discussed above336 and
333. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
334. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78
(1998).
335. See supra notes 262-64.
336. See supra Part V.
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the social science evidence on the responses of sexual harassment
victims.337 Because it regards informal structures and the informal power
of supervisors to be as important as formal structures and official
supervisory action, it classifies constructive discharge as a tangible
employment action. Like the pro-plaintiff approach, the focus is on the
effect on the employee rather than on the formal or informal nature of the
employer's conduct.
Moreover, because the causation-based model recognizes the
interdependency of economic and psychological harm, it treats all
constructive discharges alike, whether they derive from intangible, hostile
working conditions or more tangible, discrete discriminatory actions, such
as a cut in pay or demotion. Under this model, if the plaintiff proves that
she has been constructively discharged, the employer is vicariously liable
for all causally related damages and may not invoke the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense. Because the model considers the response of the
typical employee to be a reasonable response, and because most harassment
victims do not use their employer's internal grievance procedure to report
incidents of harassment, the causation-based model does not expand the
reporting requirement devised for pure hostile environment cases into the
realm of constructive discharge.
The major innovation of the causation-based model is that it
eliminates the requirement of proof of intolerable conditions. Under this
model, the case would be streamlined to the question of whether the
unlawful discrimination suffered by the plaintiff (whether by means of
harassment or other discrimination) caused the plaintiff to quit. In this
respect, the causation-based model treats constructive discharge as a
remedy rather than a substantive cause of action.338 Thus, for example,
when a plaintiff resigns in response to a hostile environment and suffers
unemployment as a result, under the causation-based model she would be
entitled to recover both her economic and noneconomic loss. To ensure
337. See supra Part IV.
338. The causation-based model described above is not the only conceivable model that would
treat constructive discharge as a remedy rather than a substantive cause of action. For example, courts
could decide to impose vicarious liability (with no affirmative defense) only in those constructive
discharge cases stemming from discrete discriminatory actions and allow the affirmative defense
whenever the constructive discharge stemmed from a hostile environment. Under such a model,
vicarious liability would depend entirely on the categorization of the original claim, and it is unclear
whether courts would see fit to abolish the intolerability requirement in either type of constructive
discharge. I do not advocate such a remedially focused model because it extends the EllerthlFaragher
affirmative defense to cover the majority of constructive discharge cases that stem from hostile
environments and does not follow the four guiding principles discussed above.
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that plaintiffs do not resign precipitously, courts would continue to enforce
the statutory duty to mitigate damages that requires plaintiffs to make an
effort to find comparable employment when they are terminated from their
employment.339
The causation-based model, in effect, tells employees that if they stay
on the job, their duty to mitigate will most often mean that they must report
the harassment to the employer and utilize the internal grievance
procedures.34 ° While they are still employees, they must give the employer
an opportunity to correct the situation and change the working
environment. Once they decide to quit their job, however, the duty to
mitigate is transformed into the statutory duty to find comparable
employment as soon as possible.
Under this allocation of mitigation duties in cases alleging
constructive discharge, employers run the risk that they will be liable for
the economic losses plaintiffs sustain before they find comparable
employment. As noted by the Suders court, 341 this risk provides an
incentive for employers to monitor working conditions and screen
supervisors in order to prevent conditions from rising to the level of severe
or pervasive harassment and prompting employees to quit. Plaintiffs,
however, also run a risk, for if they quit too soon, before the harassment is
judged to be severe or pervasive, they must bear the economic loss
stemming from unemployment. The only safe course for plaintiffs is to
stay on the job until they are confident that a court would agree with their
assessment that the working environment was hostile or abusive. This
would seem to provide enough assurance that plaintiffs would not "walk
off the job at the first sign of harassment, '' 34' even without the added
burden of requiring proof of intolerable conditions.
Not surprisingly, under a causation-based model, we could expect that
doubts about the validity or strength of a plaintiff's claim might sometimes
be expressed through challenging proof of causation. For example,
employers who disputed a plaintiffs claim that she experienced severe or
pervasive harassment could also be expected to argue that she did not quit
because of such harassment and would likely point to reasons unrelated to
the conditions at work, such as an employee's ill health or family
obligations, as the cause of her resignation. This cause-in-fact argument,
339. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
340. The duty to report arises from the judicial interpretation of the EllerthlFaragher defense. See
supra notes 85-92.
341. See supra notes 123-24.
342. See supra note 124.
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however, potentially arises in any case of disparate treatment where the
plaintiff must tie the discriminatory conduct to the harm she alleges. In this
regard, constructive discharge cases do not seem to pose any special
difficulties with respect to proof of cause-in-fact.343
The more intriguing question is whether the notion of proximate cause
ought to be imported into Title VII to limit employers' liability in
constructive discharge cases. Employers could argue that they should not
be liable if a plaintiffs resignation was unforeseeable, unexpected, or not
the natural or probable consequence of the working conditions she
confronted (i.e., if it were not the proximate cause of the hostile working
environment). As it does in torts, the proximate cause question goes
beyond the factual inquiry of whether there is a connection between two
events and entails normative judgments about the quality of the defendant's
action and its relationship to the plaintiffs injury.344
In the context of constructive discharge, proximate cause would likely
be reduced to the question of whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to
quit under the circumstances. This inquiry bears a similarity to the
intolerability standard because both ask whether the plaintiff should have
endured more discriminatory treatment before deciding to quit and
potentially invite the factfinder to focus yet again on the objective severity
of the working conditions and whether the plaintiff took measures to
mitigate her harm. Thus, the objections to the intolerability standard,
discussed above, 345 might equally apply to assessments of proximate cause
under a causation-based model.
In constructive discharge cases, I would argue that a compelling
argument can be made for allowing employees the right to quit whenever
they are confronted with a legally actionable hostile environment. This is
tantamount to taking the position that, as a matter of law, resignation is a
foreseeable and not an unexpected response to being subjected to severe or
pervasive harassment (i.e., that proximate cause is established without a
case-by-case inquiry). Admittedly, such a judgment is not simply an
empirical matter, although the fact that employees often quit their job
because of harassment adds considerable strength to this position.346
Instead, the decision to establish proximate cause as a matter of law stems
from policy considerations-specifically, that employers ought to pay for
343. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 259 (discussing proof of causal connection in
constructive discharge cases).
344. See supra note 142.
345. See supra Part I.E.
346. See supra note 14.
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the economic consequences of supervisor-created hostile environments.
Similar to tort cases in which an original tortfeasor is held responsible for
the subsequent conduct of medical professionals or the actions of other
foreseeable intervening actors that flow normally from the original
wrongful action,347 it seems fair to hold an employer responsible when an
employee responds to persistent harassment by quitting her job. Analyzing
constructive discharge using the language of proximate cause, rather than
proof of intolerability, suggests that in the context of employment
discrimination (and similar to torts), those who violate the law should be
held responsible for all causally related harms, except in truly unusual
cases where the connection between the discrimination and the harm is too
remote, attenuated, or improbable to warrant recovery.
In the minority of constructive discharge cases in which plaintiffs quit
in response to discrete discriminatory actions-such as a discriminatory
refusal to promote, a demotion, or a cut in pay-there arguably is more
room for a case-by-case proximate cause limitation, in addition to proof of
cause-in-fact. In contrast to a hostile environment case in which the
plaintiff has already proved an aggravated form of discrimination by
establishing the existence of severe or pervasive harassment, a plaintiff in a
discrete discrimination case could conceivably quit because of minor but
actionable discrimination. In such a case, courts could require plaintiffs to
prove that the discrimination was a proximate cause of their resignation,
thus allowing employers to escape liability in those unusual situations
where only the most sensitive employee would quit when exposed to such a
non-severe form of discrimination. The causation-based model thus uses
proximate causation, a familiar and flexible concept, to screen out those
cases that courts seemed most concerned about when they first developed
the intolerability standard.348 In my view, it represents an improvement
over the intolerability requirement because it conforms to the general
structure of proof in Title VII cases (i.e., discrimination, causation, and
damages), is consistent with the statutory language of Title VII, 34 9 and does
not treat constructive discharge as a distinctive claim that requires yet
another doctrinal framework.
347. See DOBBS, supra note 142, § 192, at 481 (discussing proximate cause cases involving
foreseeable intervening actions).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
349. The Supreme Court has recently expressed its reluctance to impose a heightened proof
requirement in Title VII cases absent explicit statutory authorization. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
123 S. Ct. 2148, 2153-54 (2003) (holding that there is no requirement of direct evidence in mixed-
motivation cases).
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Finally, in a small but not insignificant way, the causation-based
model would redirect Title VII away from formalism by placing greater
emphasis on the informal organization, the actual behavior of employees,
and the effects of employer behavior. This move away from formalism has
the potential to cut down on the incidence of sexual harassment because it
addresses the prevailing norms and practices in the workplace and seeks to
prevent courts from minimizing or misdiagnosing the problem. The
causation-based model also attempts to curb the courts' enthusiasm for
privatization of Title VII enforcement. By confining the Ellerth/Faragher
defense to pure hostile environment cases that do not entail a claim of
constructive discharge, the model would provide a remedy for the average
employee who decides to quit when faced with a hostile environment and
lacks faith in the fairness and efficacy of the employer's internal grievance
system. The model could also aid in the quest to simplify Title VII law by
providing a more streamlined version of constructive discharge that focuses
on the key elements of discrimination, causation, and damages.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite its recurring nature, constructive discharge has proven
extremely difficult for the courts to handle. The claim defies easy
categorization because it is situated on the boundary between disparate
treatment and harassment and produces a mix of economic and
psychological harm. Not surprisingly, courts have tried to push the claim
into one framework or the other, without thoroughly analyzing the doctrinal
and policy implications of their choice. They are sometimes influenced in
their choice by the cognitive association of constructive discharge with
sexual harassment and women's injuries. Now that the prototypical
constructive discharge victim is a sexual harassment victim, there is a
danger that the economic harm suffered by such employees will be eclipsed
by the psychological .harm that prompted the plaintiff to quit. My
dissection of constructive discharge along the five doctrinal axes that most
often surface in the case law convinces me that there is nothing in the
nature of the claim that dictates its placement into any one of Title VII's
frameworks of liability. In this area of Title VII law, the boundaries are
overlapping and permeable.
Beneath the classification dilemma surrounding constructive discharge
are familiar policy questions that have arisen in other contexts, particularly
in hostile environment/sexual harassment litigation. Central to deciding
how to classify constructive discharge is the substantive choice of whether
to apply strict liability or negligence in such cases. Equally important is
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the question of how the courts should evaluate an employee's response to
sexual harassment and whether they should compel employees to use the
employer's internal grievance procedures. I advocate that the courts take
the opportunity to refine constructive discharge law in order to move away
from formalism in interpreting Title VII law and privatization in enforcing
it.
The three models I offer for constructive discharge cases represent the
range of approaches that have emerged in the lower courts and can be
extrapolated from the academic and social science literature on sexual
harassment and constructive discharge. I urge adoption of a model that
would classify constructive discharge as a tangible employment action and
impose vicarious liability on employers. To provide equitable treatment of
plaintiffs and to coordinate the elements of the claim with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Ellerth/Faragher, it is also important to reconsider the
requirements for proof of constructive discharge. I propose that plaintiffs
be allowed to prevail if they prove that discriminatory working conditions
caused them to quit their job, rather than require a showing of intolerable
working conditions.
My analysis suggests that it is time to simplify Title VII law and
devise a model of adjudication for constructive discharge that focuses on
the key elements of discrimination, causation, and harm. Constructive
discharge is not rare. It is not asking too much of the law to provide a
secure avenue of relief for plaintiffs who quit their job because of
harassment by their supervisor.
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